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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores two Sino-African agricultural centres in Rwanda and Uganda 
that demonstrate Chinese agricultural technologies, and examines them as they relate to 
the changing global food order. When Sino-African agricultural engagement emerged as 
a topic of discussion in critical food studies literature in the mid-2000s, a number of 
scholars assumed the relationship was emblematic of a Chinese foray into Africa to grab 
land. However, since the first appearance of claims that the Chinese government and 
associated agricultural firms were orchestrating an agricultural venture in Africa, many 
Sino-African specialists focused their attention on countering these claims, instead 
arguing that China’s impact in rural Africa is quite modest, and the relation is in fact the 
continuation of a long history of engagement. 
Despite the active debate among scholars about Sino-African agricultural 
relations on the question of land grabbing, very little attention was paid to how 
disseminating Chinese agricultural technologies in Africa relates to the shifting dynamics 
of the global food landscape. Food studies literature tends to project the historic 
tendencies of Western opportunism in Africa onto contemporary dynamics of Sino-
African affairs – leading to claims that China is neo-colonial and grabbing land. In 
countering these claims, Sino-African specialists orient their findings on a case-by-case 
basis, and argue that China’s presence in Africa is too small to make a considerable 
difference in Africa’s rural sector. The back and forth between these two narratives has 
ultimately been unproductive when trying to draw conclusions about the current 
relationship between China, Africa, and the politics of global food and agriculture.   
In this thesis, I aim to resituate the debate on Sino-African agricultural 
partnerships to consider it as part of the changing global food system. To do so, I ask a 
question that is seldom presented in existing literature: Why is it that African countries 
are keen to articulate with China in their own agricultural development? This seemingly 
simple question helps to bridge the gap between the opposing positions on Sino-African 
agricultural relations as it engages African countries on how they make decisions in 
determining their own agricultural trajectory. It also explores what it is that China offers 
in agricultural development from the perspective of those that it partners with. The study 
is based on two Sino-African agricultural technology demonstration centres that were 
born out of the Forum on China Africa Cooperation summit in 2006. 
In asking this question, I arrive at three main conclusions. First, I find that 
China’s agricultural technologies are relatively easy to adopt in the rural African setting, 
and that building partnerships with China offers a window of opportunity for African 
countries to determine their own developmental trajectory. Second, I find that the Sino-
African agricultural development centres allow the Chinese companies that run them 
preferential access to local markets. Third, I find that the relationship is not without its 
problems, and its impact should not be inflated, as it ultimately remains a work in 
progress.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology 
Introduction 
In 2006, China and 48 African countries met in Beijing to discuss a new set of 
commitments in economic and developmental cooperation. This gathering was the third 
meeting of a platform created by China and African state leaders called the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC, or The Forum). While FOCAC had convened twice 
before, its third meeting in 2006 was a summit unlike the conferences that had preceded 
it. The 2006 summit went beyond the ministerial level, and it was attended by state 
leaders; it took place in the Great Hall of the People, in Beijing, and it was the largest 
gathering of Chinese and African delegates in history up to that point. 
 
The Forum is a catchall venue for China and African states to discuss trade, 
development, and cultural exchanges, and it is used as a stage to decorate and publicize 
Sino-African relations. The 2006 summit precipitated an array of agreements between the 
Chinese government and African states, and it attracted a groundswell of attention from 
commentators around the globe.1 However, the claim that the forum keeps with good 
faith, and benefits both China and African countries evenly has been a point of 
contention. Indeed, of all the arrangements that were made during the course of the 
summit, the proposal that spurred a particularly lively debate among observers was an 
agreement between 14 African countries and China to jointly develop agricultural 
training parks in Africa.  
 
Attention to the training parks was, however, not an unexpected reaction. Since 
the mid-1990’s tensions have been mounting about how China will feed its growing 
population,2 and the FOCAC agricultural parks sparked a renaissance in this debate. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Anshan and April (2013) discuss the conferences and summits in more detail in their book, Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation: The Politics of Human Resource Development. More information about the 
summits including speeches and communiqués can be found at The Forum’s website: 
http://www.focac.org/eng/  
2 Most notable in Brown’s (1995) book, Who will feed China?. 
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largest remaining areas of the world’s fallow agricultural land, and areas with high yield 
gaps, are spread across the African continent. The agricultural parks that were designed at 
the summit took form at the same time that there was a spike in global food prices, and 
China’s agricultural ambitions in Africa came to be understood as a reaction to this price 
shock.3 Observers began to discuss China’s role in African agricultural development vis-
à-vis claims that emerging and developed economies were rushing to acquire farmland in 
the global south to secure their own cheap food supplies.4 It appeared that the 
longstanding questions of ‘who will feed China’ had been answered: Africa would.  
 
The critique that China was orchestrating a foray into African agricultural sectors 
gained public traction, but Sino-African specialists challenged this assessment. These 
experts fact-checked claims that China was grabbing land, and argued that there is no 
evidence of a coherent plan on behalf of Chinese policy makers to take advantage of 
African countries’ rural sectors, and very little evidence to suggest China was engaging in 
nefarious ‘land grabbing’ behaviour.5 The alternate narrative on Sino-African agricultural 
engagement focused primarily on proving that China is not grabbing land in Africa, and 
aimed to show that China’s impact on the rural sector across the African continent is 
much smaller than is often reported.6 One consequence of the ‘proving-the-opposite’ 
approach is that it is based on making claims about how China is not articulating in the 
global food economy, and offers little commentary on how these dynamics between 
China and Africa link to broader shifts in the global food order. In this vein, observations 
on Sino-African agricultural cooperation have become detached from discussions on the 
global politics of food and agriculture.  
 
 The aim of this thesis, therefore, is to examine this link, and unpack how Sino-
African agricultural demonstrations can be understood as a component of the global food 
system. Academic conventions about the architecture of the global food system are that it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 GRAIN’s (2008) article titled, SEIZED! The 2008 land grab for food and financial security, provides an 
early example of this narrative. Also see, Lisk (2013) pg. 567, and Zoomers (2010) pg. 434. 
4 Cotula (2009), pg. 57-58; GRAIN (2008), pg. 2; Hall (2011), pg. 194. 
5 In Cotula’s (2009) article, the author argues that China is a leading culprit of land grabbing, but also 
suggests that the drivers of China’s engagement with Africa’s rural sector are multi-faceted, complex, and 
questionable (pg. 55). Also see Brautigam (2009), and Buckley (2013a). 
6 Pilling (2015) refers to this as ‘proving the negative’.  
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is controlled by a Western-backed corporate food regime; however, in exploring Sino-
African agricultural partnerships, we can see that there are dynamics within the global 
food system that do not fit this convention. While being cognisant that Sino-African 
agricultural engagements are not, ipso facto, a ploy by China to offshore its own food 
production, I will re-orient the conversation to understand Sino-African agricultural 
demonstration centres as a part of a changing global food and agricultural mosaic. I do so 
by focussing on the African institutions involved in the agricultural demonstrations as the 
primary agents of action in the Sino-African agricultural demonstration process. 
Specifically, I ask: Why is it that African institutions are keen to articulate with China in 
their own agricultural development? Asking this seemingly simple question has 
significant implications for re-orienting, and adding nuance, to both the discourse of 
global food politics, as well as Sino-African affairs. Answering this question requires that 
I couch the debate in the historic and contemporary Sino-African context, as well as 
within discussion on the current global food system, and these conversations have not 
been considered in tandem within the existing body of literature. 
 
Moreover, Sino-African agricultural demonstration parks that were born out of 
the FOCAC summit in 2006 have largely been analyzed as they relate to China’s 
intentions in Africa. But the intentions of African countries to partner with China have 
not been analyzed, nor have the consequences of the agricultural demonstration centres 
been explored. This missing piece of the puzzle has implicitly suggested that African 
agricultural sectors are stuck in a state of post-colonial stasis, perpetually vulnerable, and 
ripe for predation. Leaving the African narrative out of the discussion is what ultimately 
enabled commentators to suggest that China’s engagement with Africa was predatory, 
and an iteration of Western-style self-interested global arrangements. The absent voice of 
African partners in the conversation insinuates that they are not active members of the 
shifting global order, but passive and ill-equipped to make decisions in their own best 
interest. Indeed, in asking the question I have outlined above, and basing my primary data 
on Rwandan and Uganda perspectives on China’s role in African agricultural 
development I am able to unpack this crucial perspective that is often ignored.  
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Based on information gathered through primary and secondary data, I arrive at 
three conclusions that are significant for the field(s) of study. First, I argue that Chinese 
agricultural techniques are valuable in rural Rwandan and Ugandan settings, as they do 
not rely on the highly advanced and input-intensive methods that are typical of Western 
agricultural practices. In both Rwanda and Uganda the introduction of some Chinese 
agricultural methods, techniques, and crops, have assisted in the development of niche 
agricultural markets and businesses. Given these outcomes, Chinese agricultural 
demonstration centres have the overarching effect of contributing to the development of 
African rural sectors in that they provide a window of opportunity for African countries 
to determine their own developmental trajectories, and better navigate imbalances in the 
global food order that have locked many African countries into situations of slow- 
improvement.7 In light of this, I find that it is not simply China’s role in the global food 
economy that is changing. Rather, the growing agency of African countries to decide 
their own paths of development is often omitted from discussions about contemporary 
global food politics, and I argue that Rwanda and Uganda choose to articulate with China 
because China (and Chinese agricultural technologies) offer avenues of development 
whereby they can circumvent subjugation in the global food economy.  
 
Secondly, this exploration sheds new light on what it is that China itself stands to 
gain from forming partnerships with African countries. Based on the vague protocols of 
engagement, as well as the tenacity of the Chinese companies that run the demonstration 
centres to continue operating after the demonstration process has concluded, I argue that 
agricultural engagement allows Chinese companies with very little overseas experience to 
gain knowledge of, practice in, and access to agricultural subsectors in which they could 
be competitive in the future. In exploring what it is that China stands to gain from the 
new partnerships it is forming in rural Rwanda and Uganda, I conclude that conventions 
about increasing American agribusiness control in the global food economy have largely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The most pronounced programs that have impeded African agricultural development came in the form of 
Structural Adjustment Loans introduced by the World Bank in the 1980’s, which provided desperately 
needed development funding to African countries, but required strict adjustments to be made in receiving 
countries macro-economy – see Clapp (1997), pg. 12-35 – and trade conditions imposed through the World 
Trade Organization Agreement on Agriculture that took form throughout the late 1990’s, see Weis (2007), 
pg. 128-160.  
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been ignorant of the ways that Chinese firms, and China’s strategy to ‘go global’ could be 
introducing forms of diversity in the global food system. While Chinese firms may not be 
able to control African agricultural markets, the FOCAC demonstration centres are 
enabling Chinese firms to access markets where Western firms are relatively inactive.  
 
Lastly, I echo the findings of many Sino-African scholars, and argue that the 
impact of Sino-African agricultural demonstration centres should not be inflated. The 
forging of these agricultural partnerships are indicative of the growing international 
agency among African countries, but it does not indicate that a grand agricultural 
transformation has already occurred. Rather, the mechanisms of extending Chinese 
agricultural technologies in Rwanda and Uganda are imperfect, at times the relationship 
is awkward, and its success is ultimately dependent on the personal relationships formed 
(or not formed) between the African and Chinese partners who work to institute the 
demonstrations.   
 
Significance and contribution to field of study 
In 2008, Chan wrote that Sino-African studies is a place where “Africanists who 
are not Sinologists and Sinologists who are not Africanists, and political scientists who 
are neither, stray as amateurs into fields other than their own.”8 This quotation is 
emblematic of the issue that has punctuated the dialogue on Sino-African agricultural 
affairs most acutely since the 2006 summit. While food-studies literature was not always 
concerned with the 2006 summit directly, the agreements between China and Africa that 
followed this summit were foundational to the land grabbing narrative that spurred 
tensions about China’s role in rural Africa. The food studies narrative spoke about 
China’s role in Africa, but drew very little on the broader Sino-African literature.  
 
Conversely, the field of Sino-African studies became pre-occupied with 
addressing misinformation that had pervaded public and academic forums, and much of 
the literature on FOCAC agricultural centres became fixated on fact-checking and 
challenging popular claims about China-in-Africa. Consequently, positive claims about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Chan (2008), pg. 339.  
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what Sino-African affairs actually are often became addendums, or afterthoughts, in the 
conclusion of studies that spent the lion’s share of their word count clarifying what the 
relationship is not.9   
 
After nearly a decade of challenging claims that China is intent on hedging 
against its own food insecurity by purchasing or leasing land in Africa, a leading Sino-
Africa specialist published a book on the subject called, Will Africa Feed China? 
Brautigam (2015) answers the question posed in the title of her book with a resounding 
‘no’. However, as Pilling (2015) suggests, ‘proving a negative’ is unnecessary if an 
observer is unaware that the conversation existed in the first place. Brautigam’s landmark 
book and decisive conclusion that China is not attempting to use African land to feed 
itself may lead lay observers to think that the debate surrounding Sino-African 
agricultural engagement has been resolved; I argue it has not.  
 
I do not aim to challenge the notion that China’s activity in rural Africa is modest. 
In fact, my own data collection and experience in the field lead me to agree with some of 
Brautigam’s (2015) conclusions. Rather, I aim to build on this conclusion, and offer a 
foundational perspective on what I consider to be the beginning of a post-clarification 
phase of Sino-African agricultural studies. The major contribution that I make to the field 
of study in this thesis is that I add nuance to the debate, and provide new direction on 
how to consider and understand Sino-African agricultural affairs. I do this by 
understanding Chinese and African state level agricultural initiatives as a manifestation 
of the growing power of African and Chinese actors in the changing global food order.  
 
In addition to the contributions that I make to the Sino-African academic field, 
this thesis – and area of study more broadly – has implications that reach beyond the 
immediate vicinity of the dialogue itself. There is a general consensus among China-
focussed international relations scholars that mainstream and academic theories about 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 For example, Brautigam and Zhang (2013) offer one of the few discussions about the role of African 
agencies in Sino-African affairs, and while it is noted in both the introduction and conclusion of the article 
that African countries play an active role in the relationship, it is never discussed thoroughly in the body of 
the article – which focuses on the myth and reality of China’s rural engagement in Africa.  
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China can inform conscious government policy, and it is every bit as damaging to 
magnify the global impact of China’s development as it is to underestimate it.10 Further, 
FOCAC itself and the agreements that it precipitates are indicative of China’s increasing 
global confidence, and a consequence of this heightened global assertion means the 
dangers of misinterpreting China will become more profound.11 The critical contribution 
that this thesis makes to this issue is that it offers an examination of the nature of Sino-
African affairs from the perspective of those who have been peripheral in previous 
analyses, and in doing so presents a pragmatic version of Sino-African affairs. It is 
crucial that this type of analysis continues to be conducted, as misconceptions of China’s 
impact in Africa could produce a ripe situation for political friction, and economic 
miscalculations – if they have not done so already.12 
 
Background on Case Selection and Field Work 
Selecting cases for this study was a challenge. Some of the centres that were 
agreed upon at the 2006 summit have no information about them other than to say just 
that, ‘they were agreed upon’. Rwanda was first identified as a good case for this study as 
the centre there focuses on crops such as rice, which have been highly politicized in 
existing literature,13 as well as non-land intensive crops such mushrooms, and silk 
production (sericulture). Rwanda is also the most densely populated country in mainland 
Africa and poses unique farming challenges in that it is exceptionally hilly.14 The 
geography of Rwanda alone provided a means to challenge the claim that China’s 
ambition in rural Africa is solely focussed on land, and this helped delineate other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Nolan (2012) pg. 132. Shambaugh (2013) also makes note of this through an invocation of a speech 
given by Nye (2012) at the Aspen Institute, pg. 237.  
11 Osnos (2015) hints at this, though he does so in relation to Sino-American relations regarding disputes in 
the South China Sea.  
12 In 2012, Hillary Clinton toured six African countries, and stirred controversy when she encouraged 
students at a University in Senegal to pursue democracy and partnerships with ‘responsible powers’. 
Clinton made her tour just a few months after a 2012 FOCAC meeting where China had extended a $20 
billion line of credit to the continent. Xinhua News referred to Clinton’s speech as a ‘thinly veiled 
criticism’ of China’s engagement with Africa and said, "Whether Clinton was ignorant of the facts on the 
ground or chose to disregard them, her implication that China has been extracting Africa's wealth for itself 
is utterly wide of the truth". See Associated Press (2012).  
13 One example of many is GRAIN’s (2009) article that discusses a potential investment by Yuan Longping 
High-Tech Agriculture near Bamako, Mali, to introduce hybrid rice seeds following the 2008 food price 
crisis. Yuan Longping has stirred controversy before: see GRAIN (2006).   
14 Rwanda is nicknamed ‘The Land of 1000 Hills’. 
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incentives behind the Sino-African demonstration parks.15 One of the official languages 
in Rwanda is English,16 and members of the Rwanda Agriculture Board (RAB) were 
receptive to inquiries about allowing me to access the centre. It was important to have a 
partner institution for this study and an individual link to that institution, as the goal of 
this study was to speak with people in institutions that negotiate and partner with China.  
 
 Initially, I was concerned about getting a research permit in Rwanda, as all 
foreign researchers require a permit, and my primary contact at the Rwanda Agriculture 
Board (RAB) explicitly requested that I get a research permit before beginning my study. 
The minimum timeline for acquiring a research permit is three months according to the 
Directorate General of Science, Technology, and Research in Rwanda (with the 
exception of some extenuating circumstances). It was unclear whether or not I would be 
able to get special consideration to hasten the permit process, and so I sought ethical 
clearance to do research in Uganda as well. This would have given me the option to 
conduct research in Uganda if the permit in Rwanda took too long. However, there were 
no issues with obtaining a research permit within a few weeks. Once research in Rwanda 
was under way it became clear that much of the information I was collecting was specific 
to Rwanda, and introducing another case for comparison would allow me to separate 
country specific issues from more general issues on Sino-African agricultural 
partnerships.  
 
 Initiating the research process in Uganda happened much more quickly. I 
contacted the National Fisheries Resources Research Institute (NaFIRRI) – the research 
arm of the ministry of agriculture in Uganda that hosted the Chinese – and they were 
keen to partner in my study. Researching in Uganda required far less travel due to the 
proximity of the demonstration centre to Kampala (where I was staying) and participants 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 One question I often posed to participants in Rwanda regarded land grabbing, and whether or not the 
demonstration centre seemed to be an entry point to access more land. Many participants would mention 
the unique farming challenges they themselves faced, and suggested that this challenge combined with the 
density of the population made Rwanda perhaps one of the least likely destination for land grabbing in 
Africa.  
16 The three official languages of Rwanda are Kinyarwanda, English, and French.  
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were generally available for interview on much shorter notice. In all, I spent roughly four 
months in Rwanda, and two months in Uganda.  
 
I was also exposed to some informal research opportunities by chance. I was able 
to accompany the Rwandan and Chinese demonstrations workers to an agricultural fair in 
Butare (Rwanda’s second largest city), and talk with the team as they displayed the 
mushrooms and rice that they had grown at the centre to the public. I visited one of 
RAB’s seed production outposts in an area outside of Butare called Mututu, where the 
Chinese team had experimented with upland rice varieties, and a rice cooperative had 
adopted one of their short-grain paddy seeds. In Uganda, I joined a researcher from 
NaFIRRI to an agricultural exhibition that showcased small agricultural industries in 
Uganda to Chinese investors. The Minister of Agriculture of Uganda spoke to the 
Chinese delegation publicly at the show, and in his address he (unwittingly) answered all 
the questions I would have asked him had he been available for interview. I was also able 
to access the original protocols for both the centres, as well as a few other documents 
relating to the negotiations of the centres. 
 
Methods 
This thesis is based on a grounded analytical approach to Sino-African 
agricultural affairs. I have not relied on any one theoretical framework; rather, I have 
analyzed both primary and secondary data inductively. I began the process with a 
literature review prior to conducting fieldwork to verse myself in the currents of Sino-
African agricultural relations, as well as the international relations of food and 
agriculture. I used this review to develop my understanding of what information was 
missing in the literature, and explore discrepancies between different bodies of theory.   
 
During my fieldwork I conducted 44 formal and semi-formal interviews, which 
were based on set questions. Interviews were then recorded, transcribed, and coded 
according to theme. I also conducted five ‘field visits’, which were unrecorded, and 
therefore not transcribed or coded, though I have used some notes from these field visits 
in this thesis. Interviews were conducted with key-informants, which I classified as 
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Rwandan and Ugandan decision makers who coordinated the implementation and 
management of the centres; Rwandan and Ugandan researchers, technicians, and 
assistants who worked alongside the Chinese at the demonstration centres; and 
entrepreneurs, agricultural technicians, and farmers who had been trained at the centres, 
or associated with the centres. Interviews were conducted at the demonstration centres in 
Rwanda and Uganda, at the respective ministries of agriculture, or at government 
research institutions that oversaw the demonstrations. Some interviews were conducted 
informally with participants while they showed me demonstration plots, and a few others 
were conducted at cafés or restaurants. In Rwanda, most interviews were conducted at the 
Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI) and RAB headquarters in Kigali, or at RAB’s 
southern research centre in Rubona (about two hours south of Kigali). Interviews in 
Uganda were mainly conducted in Kajjansi (just south of Kampala) at the Aquacultural 
Research and Development Centre (ARDC), or at the National Fisheries Resources 
Research Institute (NaFIRRI) headquarters in Jinja (two hours South of Kampala on the 
Nile River).  
 
For various reasons, it was a challenge to interview Chinese staff at the 
demonstration centres. In Rwanda, there was no translator present at the centre. My 
interactions with the Chinese technicians were lively and positive, but limited given that I 
do not speak Mandarin. I did interview one of the three Chinese technicians in Rwanda 
who had the strongest grasp of English, but the interview was limited to basic questions. 
In Uganda, I was under a tighter time constraint, and I was unable to interview all the 
research officers at ARDC that I wanted to. Building rapport with the Chinese technicians 
was an added challenge. In my many visits to the demonstration centre, I only saw the 
Chinese technicians twice. Given that I was unable to interview Chinese technicians in 
Rwanda, and wanted to be consistent in my methods, interviewing the Chinese 
technicians in Uganda was not a priority. The conclusions I have drawn in this thesis 
about the benefits for China in partnering with African countries in agricultural 
development are the result of secondary data analysis; the analysis of documents 
pertinent to the demonstration centres that I collected in Rwanda and Uganda; and 
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reflections on experiences that Rwandans and Ugandans had with their Chinese 
counterparts that were discussed in interviews.  
 
I analyzed my primary data using NVivo, and coded the data according to themes 
that emerged in the interviews. Some information that was coded focused on 
corroborating information, and clarifying facts and timelines between interviews. For 
example, I coded for discussions on the techniques that were demonstrated at the centres, 
and how they were different from techniques that had been used before. Concurrently, I 
coded transcriptions by theme, or opinions expressed about certain topics, as this helped 
to uncover the Rwandan and Ugandan narrative of the partnerships. Most codes related to 
specific questions that were part of my set questions, and where therefore repeated from 
interview to interview.17 
 
I returned to my literature review after analyzing my primary data to highlight 
concepts that emerged during the field process. This was necessary for my method, as I 
was not looking to pull out particular themes during the interviews. Instead, I sought to 
corroborate information, pose existing criticisms of Chinese investments in agricultural to 
participants, and gauge responses to these criticisms. My method was to allow themes 
and questions to emerge during the field process, rather than trying to extract themes 
from the literature, and then fit the primary data to those themes.  
 
Analytical approach  
I analyzed relevant primary and secondary data as it relates to the two main lenses 
of analysis in Sino-African agricultural affairs: what are often referred to as the optimistic 
and pessimistic lenses. I associate the pessimistic lens with food studies scholars who saw 
Chinese agricultural demonstrations as examples of land grabs for China’s food security, 
and I associate the optimistic lens with Sino-African scholars who challenged these 
claims. However, I see both these lenses as problematic. Sino-African specialists have 
aimed to question the factual credibility of critical food studies, and argued that 
pessimistic claims about China’s role in rural Africa are inaccurate. Alternatively, these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See appendices A and B for a full list of interview questions and transcription codes.  
	   12	  
optimistic assumptions have been theoretically inconsequential for advancing our 
understanding of trends in the global food system. My analytical approach bridges the 
gap between these two narratives on Sino-African affairs, and explores the strengths and 
shortcomings of both. 
 
In my analysis, I draw on comparisons between cases of Sino-African agricultural 
cooperation in Rwanda and Uganda to better understand the relationship. The 
comparative nature of the study allows me to differentiate between country specific 
phenomenon in the relationship, and more general trends about what it is that China can 
offer in agricultural development. Through the analysis of my primary data I find that 
there is reason to see merit in both optimistic and pessimistic views of the Sino-African 
demonstration centres in Rwanda and Uganda.  
 
Thesis Structure 
This thesis begins with a review of relevant literature on Chinese and African 
agricultural demonstration centres (chapter 2). The review gives equal billing to the 
literature that forms the theoretical backdrop of critical food studies assumptions about 
Sino-African agricultural affairs, and that China’s goal in rural Africa is to grab land. I 
also discuss Sino-African literature that challenged food studies, and argued that China’s 
role in rural African is modest. In addition, chapter 2 will offer a history of Sino-African 
affairs so that the following analysis can be situated both theoretically, and historically. 
The literature review is largely based on academic sources, though I also draw on news 
sources, and include the works of African academics and African journalists where 
possible.  
 
In chapter 3, I explore the food security status of Rwanda and Uganda, and the 
agricultural programs that those countries are employing to improve their respective rural 
sectors. Here I build the case that Rwanda and Uganda have well developed agricultural 
development plans of their own, and I lay the groundwork to show that the FOCAC 
demonstrations centres enable Rwanda and Uganda to achieve some of these 
developmental objectives. Information in the chapter is based on a combination of my 
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own primary data, as well as an exploration of Rwandan and Ugandan agricultural 
policies.  
 
In chapter 4, I explore the inception of the centres – why it is, specifically, that 
Rwandan and Ugandan delegations sought to partner with China in agricultural 
development, and how the 2006 summit led to the centres’ emergence. I discuss the 
protocols of the demonstration centres, and outline the specific development programs 
within Rwanda and Uganda to which the demonstration centres contributed. I also rely on 
technical documents that I had access to during my fieldwork, and I use some primary 
data. In chapter 5, I will analyze chapters 3 and 4 in-light of the optimistic and 
pessimistic lenses, and engage more explicitly with the Rwandan and Ugandan narrations 
of their experience working with the Chinese. I conclude the study and discuss its broader 
implications in chapter 6.  
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Chapter 2: Understanding China and Africa through theory and 
history 
Optimists and Pessimists: Theoretical lenses on Sino-African Affairs  
 Many scholars of Sino-African affairs note that analysts tend to understand Sino-
African affairs through an optimistic or a pessimistic lens. For example, Shinn and 
Eisenman (2014) outline the optimistic and pessimistic lenses of analysis in their book 
China and Africa: a Century of Engagement, and offer an in-depth discussion of these 
camps in the first chapter of the book. Alden (2007) identifies three camps of thought, 
which he deciphers as those who see China as a development partner, a competitor, or a 
colonizer.1 However, I would argue that two of these categories – the competitor and 
colonizer – could both ultimately be understood as pessimistic lenses.2 Indeed, many 
other authors discuss optimism and pessimism as well.3 
 
These lenses are particularly pronounced within the discussion of China’s role in 
African agriculture, and the specifics of how they are expressed are unique to the field. 
Ultimately, food studies literature occupies the pessimistic camp, while Sino-African 
specialists are more optimistic about the relationship, and it is important to understand 
how these perspectives present themselves in the literature, as the way that optimists and 
pessimists responded to Sino-African agricultural relations forms the foundations of the 
analysis that I have used in this study. 
 
Pessimism, FOCAC, and the land grab 
Broadly speaking, the pessimistic view of China’s role in Africa suggests that 
China's interest in Africa is largely based on gaining access to resources – or at the very 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Alden (2007) pg. 5-6. See Buckley (2013a) for an example of how all three lenses were present in a report 
on a Chinese demonstration in Senegal. . 
2 The ‘competitor’ lens argues, according to Alden (2007), that China’s engagement with Africa focuses on 
a resource grab, while the ‘colonizer’ lens sees China’s role in Africa as one based on political control. 
Ultimately, these two lenses embody different forms of pessimism. 
3 See Adem (2013), and Shambaugh (2013).  
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least, that China’s impetus to create cooperative structures with Africa is a product of its 
quest for power.4 Pessimists do not always place much weight in China and Africa’s 
historic engagement.5 Rather, pessimistic assumptions about China’s role in Africa focus 
narrowly on post-reform China’s interest in economic growth and development. 
Concurrently, when pessimists do couch their arguments in terms of China and Africa’s 
historic engagement, they tend to focus on China’s revolutionary era when its 
propagandising of socialist revolution was particularly acute.6 Ultimately, the pessimistic 
view understands China, and its policy in Africa, as one that will perpetuate African 
dependence on foreign governments, and reinforce imperialistic divisions of labour. 7 
Adem (2013) discusses optimism and pessimism in China’s Diplomacy in Eastern and 
Southern Africa, and argues in the book’s conclusion that pessimists assume that the way 
that capital is used by states (which he describes as the ‘logic of capital’) is consistent, 
regardless of the state’s domestic form of governance.8 That being said, pessimists tend 
to understand China as an emerging global power, and they see capital as a tool that 
countries can use to gain, or assert, power. Indeed, this would mean that China’s 
extension of capital to Africa reflects its desire for more global control.  
 
Often when commentators discuss China’s role in rural Africa their critique will 
extend from food regime theory, which is one of the most popular analytical tools for 
studying the international relations of the global food order. Early explorations of food 
regime theory sought to uncover the role that agriculture played in the construction and 
iterations of the global capitalist economy.9 Food regimes are typically defined by 
periods of hegemony, and new regimes emerge as hegemonic powers shift. There are two 
undisputed regimes: the first food regime took place between the 1870’s and the 1930’s, 
and revolved around colonial Britain’s orchestration of food imports from its various 
tropical colonies. The second food regime took place between the 1950’s and 1970’s, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Moyo (2012) makes this observation, and does so quite clearly in her assessment of what function the 
2006 FOCAC summit served for China (pg. 85). 
5 One notable example of this would be French’s (2014) book, China’s Second Continent.  
6 See Chau (2014) and Taylor (2006).  
7 Ibid.  
8 Adem (2013), pg. 237. 
9 See Friedman (1987), Friednman and McMichael (1989), and McMichael (2009b) for more detail on food 
regimes, and food regime theory.  
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was based on Cold War America’s strategic use of its own domestic food surplus to court 
Third World countries into its “informal empire of postcolonial states”.10  
 
More recently, a discussion within food regime theory has emerged regarding a 
contested third regime that is said to operate at the behest of corporations, and argues that 
in recent decades the global food system has been governed in the interests of 
agribusinesses.11 Food regime theory in contemporary discussions of food politics is 
often invoked to encapsulate a set of assumptions about the nature of the global food 
system; that it is controlled by corporations – and to a lesser extent states – that use 
capitalism and globally liberalized markets to construct a global food order that places 
them at the top. Given that food regime theory projects its assumptions onto the global 
food economy, it sees these provisions as omnipresent – hence, its tendency to assume 
that emerging powers’ motives to participate in a more globalized food economy are 
based on aspirations for power.   
 
While it was not always the case, there are many instances were food regime 
perspectives implicitly, or explicitly, informed pessimistic assumptions about China’s 
role in rural Africa, and this trend emerged via discussions on the global land grab. One 
of the seminal discussions in food studies literature about land grabbing was written by 
an NGO called Genetic Resource Action International (GRAIN).  GRAIN had been 
monitoring the global food price crisis when the organization noticed that a number of 
companies and diplomats were organizing the purchase of large swaths of land in Africa 
and Asia.12 GRAIN argued that there were two main reasons why land was being 
purchased overseas: for financial gains, and to offshore food production. The 
organization made these arguments in a publication titled Seized! The 2008 land grab for 
food and financial security. The authors argued that China, India, Japan, Korea, Libya, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 McMichael (2009a), pg. 141. 
11 At times, the notion of a third food regime is accepted as fact in food studies literature, See for example 
Hawkes and Plahe (2008), or Burch and Lawrence (2009), while others contest this notion, for example 
Pritchard (2009).   
12 In 2013, GRAIN published a retrospective article in the Journal of Peasant Studies, in which it discussed 
its flagship land grabbing document from 2008, and goes into more detail on how it came to observe land 
grabbing as an international phenomenon – see GRAIN (2013). For examples of authors who cite GRAIN’s 
2008 article see Cotula, (2009), Pinstrup-Anderson, or Zoomers (2010). 
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Egypt, and a number of Gulf States were looking to purchase land overseas to offshore 
their domestic production.13 Although GRAIN did not engage food regime theory 
explicitly, its discussion on land grabbing did focus on capitalist and market-based 
incentives for grabbing land.  
 
The central role that China played in this article was likely due to the FOCAC 
summit that had been held shortly before it was written. While the article did not 
explicitly refer to the FOCAC demonstration centres as China’s main thrust into African 
agriculture, the article argued that the China-Africa Development Fund had been 
established to invest in African agriculture, and that one of China’s main reasons for 
investing in African agriculture was to extend Chinese farming techniques and 
technologies across the continent.14 GRAIN’s article laid the foundation for much of the 
critical food studies literature on land grabbing, and it placed China at the centre of the 
argument which suggested that land scarce countries were looking to offshore some of 
their agricultural production.15 While the article did suggest that a number of other 
countries were engaging in similar practices, China received the better part of the focus.16 
 
In the years following 2008, volumes of literature were produced about the land 
grab. China often found itself playing a central role in the debate, and the discussion 
moved into public forums as well. For example, Spencer (2008) wrote an article for the 
National Post titled ‘China expands its farmland in Africa; Country hopes to feed 1.3 
billion people’ and cited the FOCAC agricultural demonstration centre in Tanzania as 
evidence of this. Another article written for the The Economic Observer Online and titled 
‘Hopes and Strains in China’s Overseas Farming Plan’ opened with the line, “China has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See GRAIN (2008) for the original article.  
14 GRAIN (2008), pg. 3. 
15 The section of GRAIN’s (2008) article beginning on page 3 titled, Food security seekers, outlines this 
argument in more detail.  
16 Brautigam (2013) found that the word’s ‘China’ or ‘Chinese’ appear 47 times throughout the article, pg. 
1678. In my own search of the article I found that Saudi Arabia, the Middle East, and Egypt are only 
referred to 15 times. This imbalance does suggest, implicitly, to auditors that China is a major player in the 
global land grab. 
	   18	  
planned to develop agriculture production abroad to guarantee domestic food security”, 
and cited the FOCAC demonstration centre in Sudan to prove its point. 17 
 
GRAIN’s (2008) article was without question a central player in introducing the 
land grab as a topic in food studies, and it was quickly incorporated into food regime 
theory. McMichael (2009), for example, mentions that states’ decision to offshore food 
production in the wake of the 2007-2008 global food price crisis reflected an unravelling 
of the corporate food regime, and actors within the global food system recognized that 
the neo-liberal architecture of the global food economy was insufficient at allocating food 
supplies during times of price volatility.18 In making this argument McMichael (2009) 
cites the GRAIN (2008) publication about the land grab. 
 
Many other analysts who evaluated the global food economy and land grabbing in 
the wake of the 2007-2008 food price crisis were equally pessimistic about the role of 
foreign states in African rural sectors. For example, Zoomers (2010) argues that there are 
seven processes driving the global land grab, but attributes the main process as being one 
of finance-rich, resource-poor countries who sought refuge from price volatility in the 
wake of the global food price crisis.19 Robertson and Pinstrup-Anderson (2010) echoed a 
very similar sentiment, saying: 
 
The most common characteristics of foreign investors in the acquisition of land 
are capital-rich, natural-resource poor Arab and East Asian governments and 
corporations, many of whom suffered from the 2007 to 2008 rises in food prices20 
 
Given that this was a common vision of the climate of the global food system in 
2008, the discipline of critical food studies found itself situated against a theoretical 
backdrop that was insufficient to analyze the nuance of contemporary Sino-African 
agricultural cooperation. It either saw Chinese investments in African rural sectors as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 See Li (2008).  
18 McMichael (2009), pg. 292 
19 Zoomers (2010), pg. 1. 
20 Robertson and Pinstrup-Anderson (2010), pg. 273.  
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product of power, or a scramble for land in the wake of a food crisis. One hint of 
optimism within the pessimistic understating of Sino-African affairs is that it understands 
that the fate of investments in Africa will be determined by regulation of the host 
countries, and not by the intentions of Chinese investors.21 That is to say that the 
pessimistic lens sees colonial echoes in Sino-African relations, but understands that 
China’s involvement in Africa will only have consequences that resonate with 
colonialism if the investments are not properly managed. If the investments are not 
regulated, pessimists see that Sino-African cooperation will solidify Africa as a continent 
to plunder.22  
 
Optimism and alternatives to the West 
The most optimistic version of Sino-African agricultural engagement emerged in 
the mid-1990’s as an exploration of Chinese aid.23 Brautigam (1998) provided the 
seminal analysis, and examined Chinese aid in rural Africa as a projection of the politics 
and aspirations of the Communist Party. However, it was not until the land grab emerged 
as a topic in food studies that the optimistic lens became more pronounced. 
 
The optimistic lens has been highly China-centred, which is to say that it focuses 
on China’s intentions in Africa, or it explores the outcomes of Sino-African engagement 
from the Chinese perspective.24  It tends to ground itself in history, rather than theory, 
and often argues that the Chinese demonstration centres that are currently operating in 
Africa are ultimately extensions of agricultural aid that China has provided to African 
countries since the 1980s. In light of this, the optimistic lens often suggests that when 
China’s investments are understood as distinctly Chinese, they will offer positive 
alternatives to Western-led versions of aid or engagement in Africa.25 In addition, this 
lens seeks to challenge mainstream perceptions of China’s involvement in Africa in two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Cheru and Calais (2010) discuss this concept at length in an essay titled, Countering ‘new imperialism’: 
what role for the new partnership for Africa’s development?, in the book, The Rise of China & India in 
Africa, pg. 221-237.   
22 Ibid.  
23 Brautigam’s (1998) book was one of the first to look at cases of Chinese rural aid, though the author had 
done some work on Chinese aid in rural Africa prior to 1998 as well. See Brautigam (1983, 1993)  
24 Notable examples are Brautigam and Tang (2009), Buckley (2013a), or Li et al. (2012) 
25 Brautigam (2011), pg. 3.  
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distinct ways. In a broad sense, it challenges the pessimistic assumption that China’s 
engagement in Africa promotes illiberalism,26 and with respect to China’s rural 
engagement, the central tenet of the optimistic argument is that China’s agricultural 
investments do not aim to grow food for Chinese markets, but sell their produce to local 
markets and encourage local development. 
  
As Alden (2007) outlines, optimists often view China as being a development 
partner, and they see China’s investments in Africa as part of a long-term commitment to 
build cooperative relationships across the developing world. This lens reaches to the early 
history of the CPC to suggest that China’s involvement in African agriculture has been a 
steadfast component of its foreign policy.27 It suggests that China’s impetus to ally with 
Africa is based on China’s historic tendency to identify with developing countries, and in 
doing so, offers different avenues of economic development.28 Optimists draw on China’s 
own historic experiences in its rural sector to argue that there could be lessons for African 
countries,29 and this is where the optimistic narrative begins to conflict on theoretical 
grounds with the pessimistic lens, and food regime theory. China’s domestic agricultural 
development is often measured against Johnston and Mellor’s (1961) framework for 
analyzing the role of agriculture in economic development.30 Johnston and Mellor’s 
framework is based on capitalistic ideals of agricultural development, and outlines a 
developmental path that encourages industrialization in the agricultural sector. Friedman 
and McMichael (1989) explicitly challenge the Johnston-Mellor framework, and mention 
this in the first paragraph of their seminal food regime paper.31 Therefore, some reasons 
that optimists have for looking favourably on China’s role in Africa’s rural sector are 
irreconcilable with how pessimists see the relationship. Optimists see the extensions of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Shinn and Eisenman, (2014) pg.13 
27 Li et al. (2012), 228-229 
28 This assertion, that China offers different avenues of development is perhaps one of the most common 
arguments among optimists. See Brautigam (2011), Buckley (2013b) for a few examples.  
29 Li et al. (2012) devote the entirety of their book titled, Agricultural Development in China and Africa, to 
this subject. 
30 Huang et al. (2008) use Johnston and Mellor’s (1961) framework to analyze the successes and failures 
China’s agricultural development since 1978. Xu and Li (2013) also invoke Johnston and Mellor’s 
framework when discussing lessons from China’s agricultural development that could be useful for African 
countries.  
31 Friedman and McMichael (1989) actually mention a book written by Johnston and Kilby (1975) that 
draws on Johnston’s earlier work with Mellor.  
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agricultural technologies that spurred economic development within China to Africa as 
innately good, while pessimists see this very same development as intrinsically bad.  
 
In Adem’s (2013) China’s Diplomacy in Eastern and Southern Africa, the author 
highlights that pessimists see the ‘logic of capital’ as consistent, regardless of the state 
that it extends from. Optimists celebrate China’s involvement in Africa based on their 
assumption that the opposite is true – optimists see that the logic of capital changes with 
respect to who is sitting in the driver’s seat.32 We can see an echoing of this opinion 
throughout much of the optimistic narrative. Brautigam (2011) argues that China is well 
known for building infrastructure in Africa, which allows African industries to access 
resources. Brautigam (2011) suggests that this is a practice that is in the best interests of 
African countries as it allows them to develop their resource industries according to their 
own terms. Optimists see China’s agricultural investments as accomplishing a similar 
goal: providing agricultural equipment and seed technology will allow countries with 
underdeveloped agricultural sectors to increase their yields. In this light, the optimistic 
lens sees Chinese capital as liberating for African industries and offers much-needed 
development assistance, as opposed to being purely commercial.  
 
The optimists see Chinese capital being mobilized at the behest of China’s own 
political aspirations, which they see as unique. A consequence of this is that Chinese 
capital will have drastically different implications for African development because, as 
optimists see it, China’s ambitions in Africa are quite different from the West. Optimists 
do indeed believe that China is interested in increasing its global influence, but argue that 
China does not see existing international institutions as the avenue along which it would 
like to exert this influence.33 Instead, China chooses to generate its own avenues of 
cooperation.34 Li et al (2012) argue that China’s post-socialist reform and economic 
development provides a workable model for other countries to follow in attempting their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Adem (2013), pg. 236. 
33 Shambaugh (2013) discusses this idea more as it relates to the liberal school of IR (pg. 312).  
34 For example, Sino-African optimists may see institutions such as FOCAC as beneficial to the 
international system. See Anshan and April (2013).  
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own economic transformations.35 In light of this, China is trying to isolate elements of its 
post-revolutionary transformation that it can use to influence other countries, and 
optimists see China’s agricultural experience as a key factor of its development model.36 
 
The History of Sino-African Affairs  
There have been a number of chapters to Sino-African interaction throughout 
history, and commentators will invoke different episodes of the interactions to serve 
distinct purposes. When giving speeches to African delegations, members of The Party 
will often reach as far back as the 15th century, during the Ming Dynasty, when Zheng He 
made seven expeditions across the Indian Ocean – the 5th and 6th of which landed on the 
Somali, Kenyan, and Mozambican coasts.37 The Ming dynasty eventually withdrew its 
expeditions to East Africa due to a power struggle in the Ming court between the official 
class and the eunuchs who had grown powerful during China’s maritime expansion; 
Zheng He himself was a eunuch.38 Ming trade with East Africa eventually ceased, and 
though it was brief, this episode of Chinese and African interaction in the 15th century 
remains marked by the Party to suggest that China has historically been friendly to 
Africans, and that it has never had colonial ambitions.39 Following Zheng He’s 
exploration of the Indian Ocean, Chinese and African interactions were relatively 
unremarkable until the 1950’s.  
 
In examining the history of Sino-African affairs it becomes evident that China’s 
policy towards Africa cannot be separated from China’s broader foreign policy, or the 
political and economic conditions within China and the globe at a given time. The 
relationship is ever evolving, and constantly re-shaping itself; however, each time Sino-
African affairs is re-articulated, it carries the sentiments of its historic linkages. And it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Li et al. (2012), pg. 231.  
36 Brautigam (2009) notes this in The Dragons Gift, pg. 247. 
37 There is a litany of examples of this invocation that are used when Chinese officials present to groups of 
people all across the African continent – not just on the Eastern coast where Zheng He landed. For 
example, the Chinese ambassador to Namibia, Xin Shungkang, discussed Zheng He’s voyages at the 65th 
Anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in Namibia. See Xin (2014). 
38 Shinn and Eisenmann (2012), pg. 20.  
39 The Chinese ambassador to South Africa, Tian Xuejun, mentioned this explicitly in an address to the 
South African Institute of International Affairs, just weeks before the 2012 FOCAC conference in 
Johannesburg. See Tian (2012).  
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for this reason that contemporary Sino-African affairs need be situated both historically 
and geopolitically to be fully appreciated. Moreover, an understanding of the history of 
Sino-African engagement can help us understand the origin of contemporary narratives, 
as well as how omitting certain components of the history can skew analysis.  
 
The Foundations of the CPC’s Foreign Policy 
Mao Zedong first began to articulate how the Communist Party would define 
itself to the outside world in 1949. At this point Mao’s party had taken control of the 
mainland following a sporadic 28-year civil war with the Kuomintang (KMT). In a 
speech commemorating the 28th anniversary of the CPC called ‘On The People’s 
Democratic Dictatorship’ Mao began to lay clear the foundation of how the CPC would 
orient itself in the global political landscape. Mao wrote, “Internationally, we belong to 
the anti-imperialist front, headed by the Soviet Union”, and that “all Chinese without 
exception must lean towards the side of imperialism or that of socialism.”40 It goes 
without saying that the CPC encouraged ‘the people’ to side with socialism; however, 
this posed a major hiccup for the international legitimacy of the CPC, as the nationalist 
KMT had won the support of the United States both during, and after, the Second World 
War.41 The newly formed People’s Republic of China had established a Cold War 
alliance with the Soviet-Union called the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty.42 This 
agreement led the CPC to be reliant on the Soviets for material support and diplomatic 
backing to defend itself from threats posed by the United States. And so it was that the 
CPC gained control over the mainland – isolated from the West due to its association 
with the Soviets – yet bound to the Soviet Union for support based on the Sino-Soviet 
treaty.43  
 
The CPC needed a response to this predicament. In Mao’s same pronouncement 
of Democratic Dictatorship he drew heavily on Sun Yat-Sen – the revolutionary ‘Father 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Mao (1949).  
41 The first two chapters of Chang’s (1990) book, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and The 
Soviet Union, 1948-1972, goes into this era of Sino-American affairs in detail.  
42 Sutter (2011) mentions this under the entry SINO-SOVIET ALLIANCE and SINO-SOVIET 
FRIENDSHIP TREATY, 1950, pg. 220-221. 
43 Ibid. 
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of the Nation’ who had led a revolution against the Qing dynasty, and founded post-
dynastic China in 1911. In the speech, Mao said:  
 
Externally, [we will] unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world 
which treat us as equals and unite with the peoples of all countries. That is, ally 
ourselves with the Soviet Union, with the People's Democracies and with the 
proletariat and the broad masses of the people in all other countries, and form an 
international united front.44 
 
The adoption of Sun Yat-Sen’s teaching into a foreign policy was articulated at a 
ripe point in history – though not by intention – as many African colonies were poised to 
emerge as independent and anti-imperialist themselves. The first five years of the CPC’s 
rule in China were a time of self-determination, and while the CPC searched for its 
identity, it did not structure any strong policy towards Africa – or anywhere for that 
matter – until China and India began to discuss trade in the Tibet region of the China-
India border in 1954.  In April 1954, the Government of the Republic of India and the 
CPC signed the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse with Tibet Region. The purpose of 
the agreement was ultimately to establish a set of provisions about trade and the free 
movement of pilgrims in the Himalayan border areas.45 The provisions were given as 5 
principles: 
 
1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty 
2. Mutual non-aggression 
3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs 
4. Equality and mutual benefit 
5. Peaceful co-existence46 
 
This agreement sent a very clear message to Asian countries: China would tolerate 
signing agreements with democracies; it was willing to entertain the idea of trade; and it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Ibid. 
45 GOI (1954). 
46 Ibid.  
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was willing to accommodate the religious liberties of individuals who moved between the 
borders of China and India. By extension, this signalled that it was willing to tolerate 
other beliefs and forms of governance. Ultimately, the agreement had the effect of 
quelling anxieties that China sought to propagate communism, but showed that China 
was content to peacefully harbour its own communist leanings insofar as its ability to do 
so was not challenged. This was, in fact, the design of the agreement. Shortly after it was 
signed in 1954, China’s premier, Zhou Enlai, sent a telegraph to Mao and the Central 
Committee, and said that the purpose of signing an agreement with India was a 
preparation to sign further agreements with Asian countries and “strike a blow at the 
United States conspiracy to form a Southeast Asian invasive bloc.”47 
  
Signing a trade agreement with India was undoubtedly a watershed moment for 
China’s foreign engagement, and it paved the way for the CPC to participate in the 
Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, where Zhou was able to sign 
other agreements with African and Asian countries. There were twenty-nine states in all 
that participated, six of which were newly independent (or self governing) African states: 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana (known as the Gold Coast at the time), Liberia, Libya, and Sudan. 
And while Zhou’s communication with Mao may have indicated that China was 
originally interested in building partnerships with Asian countries, the conference marked 
the first meaningful contact between the CPC and African states.48 The most significant 
contact that the Chinese delegation made was with Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was the de 
facto leading figure of Egypt at the time.49 Nasser was the only major African figure to 
attend the conference, and he had met Zhou Enlai socially in Rangoon, Burma, prior to 
the conference.50  The Chinese and Egyptian delegations met frequently throughout the 
conference, and established relations. By 1956 Egypt had officially recognized the CPC 
as the legitimate ruling party of China, which was due in no small part to the relations 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Zhou (1954).  
48 Hutchinson (1975) suggests that Zhou had not attended Bandung with the intention of opening contact 
with Africa, and that it happened by chance given that Gamal Abdul Nasser was one of only a few 
statesman of equal stature to Zhou to attend the conference. See Hutchinson (1975), pg. 14.  
49 Most authors that discuss China’s involvement in the Bandung Conference note the significance of 
Zhou’s contact with Nasser. See Kachiga, (2013), pg. 31; Larkin (1971), pg.17; or Ogunsanwo (1974), pg. 
8 for a few examples.   
50 Larkin (1971), pg. 17.  
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they established in Bandung. A year later, Egypt would play host to China’s first embassy 
on the African continent – established in 1956 – which China used as a launching pad to 
Africa.51  
  
Zhou’s success at Bandung brought confidence to the party, as well as a new sense of 
enlightenment about Africa and the coming wave of decolonization. Zhou delivered the 
keynote speech at the second session of the First National Party Convention in China in 
July, 1955, shortly after Bandung, and focussed on the importance of continued support 
and cooperation with African countries. Indeed, a few months later in early 1956 Zhou 
delivered a political report to the National Committee of the CPC in which he very 
clearly anticipated the importance of Africa for building partnerships. Zhou said: 
 
There will certainly be more oppressed nations and countries who free themselves 
from colonial rule along paths of their own choosing…We wish to make contacts 
with the leaders and peoples of all these countries in pursuance of the spirit of 
Bandung.52 
 
Non-Alignment 
 At the same time that China was seeking recognition on the international stage, 
newly independent African countries were facing a number of challenges of their own. 
While China sought to understand how it should articulate with the globe, African 
countries considered how they ought articulate with each other. Indeed, connecting the 
dots of foreign policy among newly emerging African states, and more specifically, how 
those dots can be connected in relation to China is an enormous undertaking, and beyond 
the scope of this abridged history. There are, however, a number of key points regarding 
African countries’ meditation on their global engagement that can be considered 
alongside the CPC’s exploration of its own foreign policy, and why it was that African 
countries contemplated ties with China during the 1950’s and 1960’s. Paramount among 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ogunsanwo (1974), pg. 9. 
52 Zhou (1956): as cited by Shao (1996), pg. 224. 
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them was a movement of Afro-Asian solidarity – a solidarity that stemmed from a shared 
aversion to, and resentment of, imperialism.  
  
Bandung was an opportunity for China to articulate with a number of countries 
that lay outside its immediate vicinity, and it did so with some authority; however, the 
same cannot be said for the African states that attended the conference. The four 
independent African states – Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Libya – along with the two 
self-governing African territories (The Gold Coast and Sudan) were not included in the 
subcommittee on colonialism, and were peripheral throughout the conference.53 On the 
whole, the African countries’ participation at Bandung was small, and it was this modest 
role that prompted Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s Prime Minister, to call the Conference of 
Independent African States in 1958, in Accra.54  
 
The importance of courting Africa became increasingly clear to China following 
the conference. The African states outlined a number of principles that they together 
would follow; the first of which was, “Unswerving loyalty to and support of the Charter 
of the United Nations and respect for decisions of the United Nations.”55 While Chinese 
delegates ignored this statement publicly,56 and continued to preach their five principles, 
the message was clear: recognition by the UN was paramount to the CPC’s international 
legitimacy. 
 
Following the conference in Ghana, African countries would choose not to align 
to one power bloc or another in a movement that would come to be referred to as ‘the 
non-aligned movement’. Non-alignment was a rejection of adherence to a power bloc, 
and its heyday was the post Bandung era. Moreover, it was one of the first exercises in 
newly independent African countries’ self-determinism. By rejecting adherence, African 
countries were not bound to accept the ways that major powers judged international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Aforka Nweke (1980), pg. 31. 
54 Ibid 
55 el-Sebai (1958): as quoted by Larkin (1971), pg. 35.  
56 Larkin (1971), pg. 35.  
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issues.57 Non-alignment allowed African countries to play the power blocs off one 
another. It was far more advantageous to pit one bloc against another, and receive aid 
from both, than it was to adhere to just one.58 Sino-African engagement, and Afro-Asian 
solidarity more generally, became closely tied to the non-aligned movement. Afro-Asian 
solidarity was a way for former colonies to partner with each other, and participate in 
international relations at a distance from former colonizers, and participation Afro-Asian 
solidarity became a way for African countries to express their independence.59 
 
The Sino-Soviet Split, the Cultural Revolution, and Admission to the United Nations 
Following Zhou’s pronouncement of The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
at Bandung, China’s revolutionary leaning became more pronounced, and China’s 
support for resistance became more hard-lined. When there was an opportunity for China 
to support a revolutionary movement in an African country, it did. China intervened 
directly in the internal affairs of a number of countries. For example, Mao offered 
roughly a quarter of a million ‘volunteers’ to aid Egypt in the Suez crisis.60 In addition, 
China’s involvement in newly independent states tended to favour a hybrid Sun Yat-Sen-
Marxist-Leninist support for the working class, and in particular, the revolutionary 
leanings of working class political parties. This was abundantly clear in China’s support 
for the revolutionary movements in Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania.61 In some instances, 
the CPC supported multiple revolutionary movements in the same country, and did so 
simultaneously. For example, during the Angolan War for Independence, Beijing 
supported The Popular Movement for the Liberation Front of Angola, the National 
Liberation Front of Angola, and the National Union for the Total Independence of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Kimche (1973), pg. 25..  
58 Ibid.  
59 Legum (1958) as cited by Kimche (1972) pg. 21.  
60 Exactly how many ‘volunteers’ offered their services, and exactly what these services would have been 
are unclear. Khalili (1968) suggests that were about 280,000 (pg.681), while Garver (2015) suggests a there 
were 250,000 (pg. 123). Garver (2015) notes that transportation issues to get the ‘volunteers’ to Egypt 
made the offering largely symbolic. I have also put ‘volunteers’ in quotations, as this seems to be a 
standard among commentators who discuss China’s offering of assistance during the Suez Crisis. It is 
unlikely that the quarter-of-a-million ‘workers, women, and students’ (Khalili, 1968; pg. 682), who 
registered to go to Egypt did so under their own free will.  
61 These three cases form the focal points of Chau’s (2014) book, Exploiting Africa – the author argues that 
China’s diplomacy in these countries from the 1950’s through 1970’s were ideologically opportunistic, 
exploitative, and ultimately resonant of what one would expect of an aspiring world power.  
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Angola – all of which were opposing groups.62 Moreover, Beijing and the leader of the 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola used their connection with the 
National Party in South Africa to funnel arms into Angola; all while Beijing supported 
the Pan Africanist Congress – the party that aimed to topple the apartheid system, which 
was imposed by the National Party.63  
 
The Sino-Soviet rift widened during the early and mid 1960’s. The CPC 
interpreted that there was room within the principle of ‘peaceful-coexistence’ for armed 
struggles to be a part of national liberation movements. Furthermore, the CPC was 
oriented more closely with the non-aligned movement (it may have been a part of the 
communist bloc, but it was not a major power itself). China would often play the ‘race’ 
card, suggesting that China shared a commonality with Africa given that Chinese and 
Africans were coloured, and allowed the Chinese to isolate imperialism and hegemony as 
a product of ‘whiteness’ that they themselves did not embody.64 During this time, Afro-
Asian solidarity and the African-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) was 
made a ‘mockery’, as it was reduced to a forum for China and the Soviet Union to voice 
resentment for one another in an attempt to gain closer ties with African and Asian 
countries.65 
 
Some analysts – such as Taylor (2006) – begin their assessment of Sino-African 
history in the late 1960’s just prior to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution because it 
was during this period that the CPC’s inconsistent (if non-existent) policy of non-
interference became more apparent to newly independent African countries. One purpose 
of the Cultural Revolution (beginning in 1966) was an attempt to move the world’s 
attention towards Beijing as the epicentre of socialist revolution,66 as well as remove 
perceived threats from within the Party. However, its violent consequences and 
retrograde implications for science and culture had damaging effects for China’s presence 
in Africa.  During the Cultural Revolution, the CPC departed almost entirely from the 	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63 Ibid. 
64 Kimchi (1973), pg. 176. 
65 Kimchi (1973), pg. 252.  
66 Shinn and Eisenman (2012) pg. 65. 
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Five Principles, and was fervent to hear African leaders adopt the dogmatic rhetoric of 
the revolution. While some did so keenly,67 the CPC also lost the recognition it once had 
in many countries that did not identify with Beijing’s revolutionary rhetoric. By 1967, 
China had recalled all its ambassadors from Africa with the exception of an ambassador 
in Cairo who was left to coordinate all African and Middle Eastern foreign policy.68  
 
From the perspective of African countries, it was not always clear how to interpret 
China’s intentions, or the Sino-Soviet rift, during this time. Writing in 1965, a year before 
the Cultural Revolution, Senegal’s Foreign Minister (Doudou Thiam) wrote that within 
African foreign policy circles, the question was often asked whether the Chinese and 
Soviets were working in harmony, or in competition.69 The differences in interpretation 
of how the principle of ‘peaceful coexistence’ should respond to armed conflict appeared 
to be lost on many African countries, who simply saw China as a member of the 
communist bloc, and self-proclaimed leader of the third world.70 Thiam (1965) saw 
China’s role in cold war politics as a problem, and argued that its tendency to support 
armed resistance and extremist groups complicated the harmonization of African foreign 
policies. Specifically, Thiam (1965) said:  
 
The martyr’s crown which Communist China wears as a result of American 
opposition to its admission to the United Nations has the effect of making 
Africans – even those who are well known for their anti-communism – forget the 
real underlying problems raised by the existence of this colossus in a world torn 
between two rival ideologies.71 
 
The Sino-Soviet split culminated in a border conflict in February of 1969, and 
roused the leaders of the CPC from their contemplative deep freeze.72 China would 
emerge from the Cultural Revolution in 1969 and instate a new pragmatic approach to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Hutchison (1975) notes Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, and Mauritania as examples, pg. 142.  
68 Ogunsanwo, (1974), pg. 191.  
69 Thiam (1965), pg. 112.  
70 Thiam (1965), pg. 115. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Hutchison (1975), pg. 162.  
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diplomacy. The Cultural Revolution had ultimately served one of its intended purposes of 
shaking up counter revolutionaries from within The Party. However, it had also distanced 
the CPC from its goal of international recognition and respect, as its projection of a 
hyper-revolutionary persona had detached it not only from African countries, but also 
from the globe. As Hutchison put it, “The price of respectability was the abandonment of 
subversion and the ‘united front from below’, and their replacement by a correct, 
‘normal’ relationship.”73 No longer would the CPC demand a dogmatic rhetoric of 
revolution from its African counterparts, and it did not preach revolution of its own. 
China was truly prepared for ‘peaceful co-existence’.  The CPC’s willingness to realize 
its pre-Cultural Revolution policy towards Africa ultimately led to its recognition by the 
UN in 1971. The CPC was admitted to the UN general assembly by a vote of 76-35 (26 
of which were from African countries in favour) and replaced Taiwan as a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council.74  The CPC’s admission to the UN solidified its 
need to commit to a new normalcy in its external affairs. At the time, China’s relations 
with the Soviets remained frosty, though relations with the United States were beginning 
to thaw.75 It was during this period that China’s foreign policy began to shift away from 
ideological association, and towards associations based on economics.  
  
Sun (2014) notes that China’s foreign policy in Africa throughout the 1970’s saw 
massive amounts of Chinese aid flow across the continent, and suggests that this made 
very little economic sense. The Cultural Revolution left China economically 
marginalized, and providing aid to Africa was likely an attempt to address African 
reproachfulness for the Cultural Revolution. Large amounts of aid at a time when China 
was recovering from the largest famine in recorded history and economic stagnation 
would not have amounted to particularly rational policy. 
  
Throughout the late 1960’s and 1970’s, the non-aligned movement in Africa 
began to falter. The legacy of colonialism caught up with the ambitions of peace and 
independence among a number of African countries. The economic architecture of 	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colonialism, whereby African countries consume what they do not produce, and produce 
what they do not consume led to stagnating growth, and persistent poverty across the 
continent.76 Moreover, the arbitrary borders that had been imposed by colonial powers 
brought different ethnic groups into closer proximity, and ultimately led to a number of 
armed conflict – most notably those in Angola, Mozambique, Chad, Somalia, Ethiopia, 
and Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo).77 The conflicts within Africa tore at the 
Organization for African Unity (OAU) – the primary institution to embodied pan-
Africanism.78 Moreover, it was not in the interest of major powers that the non-aligned 
movement offer a third pole of global alliance, and both the Soviet Union and the United 
States were largely passive in letting the internal factors pull at the sinews of pan-
Africanism. By the late 1970’s, China itself had formed closer ties with the United States, 
its new normalcy had led it to lose the ‘martyr’s crown’ it had once worn by being 
excluded by the United States from recognition at the United Nations, and its domestic 
insecurities associated with how the CPC would maintain a monopoly on power led to a 
general lack of coherence in domestic policy, not to mention a mere total abstinence from 
engagement with Africa.  
Economic Reforms and New Institutions 
The reformist government led by Deng in the 1980’s made its first 
pronouncement of China’s new foreign policy at the 12th National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party,79 and it was during this time that China’s foreign policy 
became increasingly oriented towards economics. The pronouncement, delivered by the 
new premier, Zhao Zhiyang, referred to many of the same principles outlined by Zhou 
Enlai, such as the five principles of peaceful coexistence Shortly after this speech in late 
1982 Zhao toured 11 African countries in a clear nod to Zhou’s 1964 tour, and an 
invocation of China and Africa’s historic links.80 The tour was in no way ground 
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breaking, and Zhao only visited countries with which China already had strong 
relations.81  
 
During the 1980’s, China reiterated much of its existing policy to Africa. There 
was little innovation other than that China maintained association by means of economic 
development, not ideology. The most significant change was in 1983 at the end of Zhao’s 
tour in Tanzania where he suggested the four principles of Sino-African economic and 
technical co-operation, which he listed as follows:  
 
1. Mutual benefits 
2. Practical results  
3. Diversity in form   
4. Common development82   
 
From this point on, China’s African policy would focus on cooperative projects that 
were built as joint Chinese and African ventures, and aimed to contribution African 
countries’ to self-reliance. 83 Liu (2011) argues that the early 1980’s were a time of 
Chinese explanation to Africa. Zhao’s tour, Liu (2011) asserts, was used to suggest to 
African countries that China itself was reforming, and its ability to uphold its promises of 
aid and co-development would be put on hiatus until China had the economic ability to 
provide such assistance. Indeed, China’s early reform era was characterized by general 
uncertainty about exactly how all the facets of a more open economy would operate 
within China itself. By shifting the rhetoric from ‘aid’ to ‘cooperation’ and ‘mutual 
benefit’ China was able to set the CPC free of any sort of obligation of assistance. China 
was keen to continue using aid to Africa to maintain its diplomatic presence, but did not 
want to find itself engaged in a commitment of unidirectional economic flows when its 
own economic development was so uncertain. Much to the CPC’s relief, domestic reform 
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was very successful and did allow for Chinese aid to continue flowing across the African 
continent during the 1980’s.84  
 
In the early 1980’s much of the CPC’s aid to Africa focused on rehabilitating 
existing projects.85 Brautigam (2009) notes that during Zhao’s tour, he publicly re-
interpreted the principle of ‘non-interference’. The CPC had originally understood non-
interference in aid projects to mean that Chinese staff could not operate them. 
Infrastructure projects that China aided could be constructed by China, but managing 
them was seen as a form of interference. During Zhao’s 1983 tour he announced that 
offering managerial assistance to Chinese aided projects would actually not be 
interfering, but helping to build self-reliance.86 Following this announcement, Chinese 
projects would continue to refurbish existing projects, but the CPC also began to explore 
new projects such as the Magbass Sugar Plantation in Sierra Leone – completed in 1982, 
and run entirely by Chinese staff.87 The mutual benefit of Chinese aided projects also 
became clearer in the late 1980’s. Indeed, China would fund the reconstruction of 
factories, buildings, and infrastructure, but do so exclusively with Chinese materials. In 
1987, China announced that 69 percent of all Chinese aid funds were spent on Chinese 
equipment.88 Aid essentially became an avenue for the CPC to put money back into 
Chinese companies, and Chinese aid to Africa at the time was no small undertaking. For 
example, the same year that the CPC finished the Magbass project in Sierra Leone, it also 
commit to refurbish and renovate more that 60 Chinese projects in Tanzania alone.89 
  
While Chinese relations with African countries became more economically 
focused in the 1980’s, there were still times when the CPC needed to rely on Africa for 
political support. In 1989, the Chinese leadership was not prepared for how strong the 
international outcry about the repressions of the Tiananmen Square protests would be, 	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and in an attempt to fight isolation China needed to depend on Africa once again for 
legitimacy.90 African governments were accustomed to the international community 
accusing them of violating human rights, and many were keen to continue building 
stronger relations with China – the post-Tiananmen era provided this opportunity.91  
Indeed, the vigour of the relationship opened again at a convenient time as a decade of 
market reform was beginning to bear fruit, and China was becoming increasingly 
interested in accessing African resources. In addition, the poor outcomes of Western-
backed Structural Adjustment Programs that had been implemented by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank had created resentment for the West in Africa by the 
late 1980’s, providing additional impetus for African countries to support non-Western 
international partners.  
 
The economic realities of Deng’s reform began to take form in the 1990’s, and 
China’s economy began to boom. During this time, discussion among party leaders about 
a strategy for Chinese firms to ‘go global’ began, but it was not until the late 1990’s and 
early 2000’s that the effort became more concerted.92 During the late 1990’s the CPC 
began to encourage Chinese businesses to go overseas with incentives such as tax breaks 
and subsidized loans.93 Not only were Chinese firms encouraged to go to Africa, but also 
Chinese trade with Africa began to grow. In 1988, Chinese trade with Africa was valued 
at $1.02 billion American, and grew by an average of 25% annually; by 2000, total trade 
volume between China and African countries was estimated to be over $10 billion, and 
reached $73.5 billion by 2007.94 
  
 China’s increased trade with Africa was not isolated. It was, rather, a result of 
economic growth among Chinese and African economies, and it was along this timeline 
that the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was formed. The development of 	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the Chinese-initiated FOCAC came into being at a time when African countries 
themselves were re-organizing pan-African institutions. The New Partnership for African 
Development (NEPAD) is perhaps the most notable example of this, and one of its 
overarching goals is to articulate an authentic African owned development agenda, and 
strengthen the continent’s bargaining capacity.95 One of the key tests of NEPAD’s 
bargaining capacity and ability to guide African growth will be how it manages the new 
economic interests that China has in Africa, and that will be the focus of the next chapter.	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Chapter 3: Rwanda and Uganda’s Agricultural plans and 
development initiatives   
Introduction 
 This chapter will focus on the agricultural development plans in Rwanda and 
Uganda. As we will see, Rwanda and Uganda share a number of similar ambitions for 
development within their agricultural sectors. It is important to explore these 
development goals, as they are have a bearing on why Rwanda and Uganda sought to 
build agricultural partnerships with China, and vice versa.  
 
First, both countries encourage private development, though they do so in 
different capacities. This makes FOCAC demonstration centres attractive because they 
are generally operated by Chinese firms with the ultimate goal of becoming private joint 
ventures with local companies.1 Both Rwanda and Uganda have designed their 
agricultural policies in accordance the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development 
Plan (CAADP), which is a NEPAD initiative. Rwanda’s agricultural development seeks 
to underpin private sector growth by fostering market-oriented agriculture, and 
subsidizing inputs for farmers. The Government of Rwanda (GoR) aims to create a policy 
environment that is inviting for private investors with the ultimate goal that the private 
sector will begin providing services such as seed multiplication, value addition, and 
supply chain management. Alternatively, in Uganda, the government has mandated that 
nearly all developments within the agricultural sector should be born from the private 
sector. The Government of Uganda (GoU) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Industries, and Fisheries (MAAIF) are primarily concerned with creating a policy 
framework that removes barriers for the private sector, and offers sectorial overviews, 
data, and technical advice to farmers.  
 
Both Rwanda and Uganda coordinate much of their agricultural development 
through the research and extension arms of their respective agricultural ministries. The 	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research arm of the Ministry of Agriculture in Rwanda (MINAGRI) is the Rwanda 
Agriculture Board (RAB), which is responsible for implementing agricultural initiatives. 
The research arm of MAAIF – the National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO) 
– is the apex research institution in Uganda charged with conducting and disseminating 
agricultural research, as well as training farmers in adopting new technologies. It is RAB 
and NARO that ultimately coordinate the FOCAC agricultural demonstration centres that 
were agreed upon at the 2006 summit.  
 
This chapter will outline the developmental ambitions of MINAGRI and MAAIF, 
and sketch the development objectives that RAB and NARO are saddled with. It will also 
establish the background on why Rwanda and Uganda were interested in partnering with 
China in agricultural development, and how they became the recipients of the FOCAC 
demonstration centres – a topic that will be explored further in Chapter 4. This chapter 
will explore the food security issues in Rwanda and Uganda, and show how boosting 
production through technology transfers are areas that both the Rwandan and Ugandan 
governments have identified as being key to their development. In light of the 
information provided in this chapter, it will become clear that there are many reasons for 
African countries to court Chinese agricultural demonstration centres. Analysis on Sino-
African agricultural demonstrations in the past has tended to focus on China’s intentions 
in Africa, and asked why China may be keen to partner with African countries in 
agricultural development.2 The agricultural policy environment of African countries that 
host the demonstration centres is seldom considered as the impetus for building Sino-
African agricultural demonstrations, and in the chapter I will lay the groundwork to make 
that consideration.  
 
Food Security in Rwanda and Uganda 
Food (in) security and malnutrition are pressing issues in Rwanda. The most 
recent food security and vulnerability survey taken by the GoR (2012) found that 43% of 
children between six-months and five-years old are chronically malnourished (stunting), 
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while 3.6% showed signs of wasting, and 12% were underweight.3 Moreover, the same 
survey found that 51% of all households faced difficulty accessing food at least one point 
during the 12 month period prior to the survey.4 Roughly one-fifth (17%) of all 
households in Rwanda face acute, or seasonal food shortages, while 14% face food 
shortages chronically.5 The reasons for household food insecurity are numerous and 
varied, ranging from a household’s location relative to roads and markets, to household 
demographics, wealth, diversity of livestock, and the size of land cultivated in the first 
planting season of the year.6 
 
While these statistics indicate that there are high levels of food-insecure 
households in Rwanda, there has been some improvement in the recent past. In 2009 the 
GoR conducted a food security and vulnerability analysis, and found that of the 
population between the ages of six-months to five-years old, 52% were stunted, while 
4.6% showed signs of wasting, and 15.8% were underweight.7 In 2006, the agricultural 
sector in Rwanda employed 80% of the total population. By 2012 that number had fallen 
to 71.6% of the population.8 Agriculture currently accounts for 32.7% of the gross 
domestic product, and 28% of total growth in Rwanda – the agricultural sector itself has 
sustained an average level of growth of 5.4% since 2008.9 Labour mobility out of the 
agricultural sector is not in and of itself a positive improvement; however, at the same 
time that Rwandan farmers have been moving into other sectors, there has been a modest 
reduction in malnutrition as food production per household has increased.  Therefore, an 
increase in per-capita agricultural productivity and rural labour outflow has correlated 
with improvements in Rwandan food security. However, there is not enough information 
available to indicate that increased per-capita productivity causes an increase in food 
security.  
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Malnutrition in some regions of Uganda appears to be equally severe to that in 
Rwanda, though the data is not quite as current. In 2010, 37% of rural children were 
stunted, while 14% of urban children showed signs of stunting.10 At the same time, 5% of 
the population under five-years old showed signs of wasting, and 15% where 
underweight.11 Indeed, the base rate of malnutrition in Uganda is lower than Rwanda; 
however, Uganda is not experiencing the same levels of reduction in malnutrition. The 
percentage of the population under five years old in 2006 that was stunted was 39%; 15% 
was underweight, and 6% were wasting.12 The most recent statistics indicate that nearly 
half the population in Uganda is still food-energy deficient (48%).13 While the reasons for 
food insecurity in Uganda are equally varied to Rwanda (access to market, income, 
access to land), a key-contributing factor to food insecurity in Uganda is an unbalanced 
diet that consists largely of staples, and little substitution for meat, or high-protein 
pulses.14  
 
While access to food in Uganda is a contributing factor to food insecurity, Uganda 
does produce enough food domestically to feed its population. Uganda produces a surplus 
of beans and maize, and a sufficient amount of matooke (cooking bananas) and cassava – 
all of which are preferred staples within Uganda.15 In addition, Uganda exports coffee, 
tea, fish, and tobacco, much of which is for regional markets in Kenya and Tanzania. 16 
 
The staple crops in Rwanda are matooke, rice, wheat, maize, Irish potato, cassava, 
soya beans, and beans. It is challenging to find accurate statistics about the import and 
export markets of Rwanda’s staple crops, as much of the trade is done informally with 
neighbouring countries – namely Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC).17 This is due in part to local food preferences, as well as the 
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11 Ibid. 
12 GoU (2010), pg. 7.  
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15 WFP and UBOS (2013), pg. 6. 
16 Ibid.  
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perishability of some preferred crops (i.e. cassava).18 Rwanda does, however, export large 
quantities of coffee and tea for international markets, and is developing a nascent 
horticultural sector that targets avocados, nuts, passion fruits, pineapples, and apples.19  
 
Agricultural policy and Rwanda 
To manage these nutritional and food supply related issues, Rwanda has had an 
agricultural development plan in place since 2004 called the Strategic Plan for the 
Transformation of Agriculture (SPAT), which it updates every five years. This plan was 
designed according to Rwanda’s domestic needs and institutional structure, and done so 
in accordance with broader CAADP programs to boost agricultural production in Africa. 
Now in it its third phase, the SPAT has highlighted poverty reduction in Rwanda’s rural 
sector as key part of its mandate, and it is part and parcel of the Government of Rwanda’s 
(GoR) ambitious goal of becoming a middle-income country by 2020. Between 1997 and 
2000, the GoR undertook a consultative process involving government, civil society, 
members of the business community, and academics, to formulate a plan that could guide 
technical ministries in writing developmental strategies for their own subsectors.20  
Development in the agricultural sector at the time was particularly important, as 90% of 
Rwanda’s population was based in subsistence agriculture.21 Vision 2020 outlined that 
technical training in the sector would be key to its development, and suggested that the 
Rwandan agricultural sector should orient itself towards exporting high-value goods to 
local markets, and inviting investment to help the sector transition from one of 
subsistence to a “fully monetized, commercial agricultural sector.”22 As the GoR moves 
towards accomplishing this goal it tends to work closely with international donors. The 
GoR typically courts investors and establishes development initiatives, which it then 
encourages the private sector to manage.23 Indeed, this is how the China-Rwanda 	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Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centre (RATDC) was designed, which will be 
explored more in Chapter 4.  
 
 The first phase of SPAT focused on the general principles for agricultural 
development that were outlined in Vision 2020, as well as in Rwanda’s first Economic 
Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS I).24 It called for broad reaching 
developments such as diversification of crops and income sources for farmers; 
intensification of crop production; and prioritizing developments that would contribute to 
assisting vulnerable groups such as women and youth, and landless people.25 The plan 
also indicated that growth in the agricultural sector ought to come from two sources: 
export crops (coffee and tea), and growth in production of crops that would benefit 
internal markets such as rice, wheat, maize, and vegetables.26 Moreover, the first phase of 
SPAT aimed to identify specific international partners who had technological expertise in 
agriculture that could assist Rwanda develop these priority areas.27  
 
 The challenge of agricultural transformation in Rwanda is unique given its 
geography. Intensifying production along hillsides could increase yields in the short run, 
but it runs the risk of exacerbating runoff and hillside erosion in the long run. Roughly 
90% of Rwanda’s land is on a slope between 5% and 55%, and MINAGRI has initiated 
what is called the Soil Conservation and Land Husbandry program to combat this 
challenge.28 This has been a key program of SPAT I, II, and III, and it aims to support in 
programs and training in converting land into terraces to conserve water and soil.29  
 
However, terracing initiatives are very expensive, and the key policy implemented 
by MINAGRI to increase yields has been land tenure reforms to raise productivity in 
Rwanda’s few flat areas of viable agricultural land. MINAGRI has used a combination of 
two programs to increase yields through shifting land tenures, the first of which is called 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See GOR (2001) Vision 2020, and MINECOFIN (2007, 2013) for EDPRS I, and II respectively.  
25 MINAGRI (2004), pg. 7. 
26 Ibid.  
27 MINAGRI (2004), pg. 64.  
28 MINAGRI (2013), pg. 13.  
29 Ibid.  
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the Land use Consolidation Program, which is a policy that encourages farmers to 
consolidate the planting patterns of their collective small plots.30 The average household 
landholding among farmers is 0.76 ha, which is most commonly split into 4-5 smaller 
plots.31 Farmers prefer to divide their landholdings in this way as to avoid risks, and 
separating plots makes it easier to diversify planting. For example, if a hamlet of farmers 
held plots of land along a hillside and in the marsh below, the typical subsistence practice 
would be to grow paddy rice within the marsh, and a combination of cassava, yams, 
sweet corn, potatoes, beans, and vegetables in mixed plots along hillsides. This form of 
landholding inhibited the market orientation of the agricultural sector in that it is largely 
uncoordinated, and acts as a barrier in organizing the production and supply of market 
bound crops.  
 
Policies that can rearrange the agriculture sector to be more market oriented are 
key to the success of Vision 2020.32 The purpose of the Land Use Consolidation 
Program is to address this problem. Under this program, the Government of Rwanda 
along with municipal governments identify areas where priority crops (maize, wheat, 
Irish potato, cassava, beans, and soybean) can be grown. The local governments then 
encourage farmers in that area to consolidate portions of their landholdings under the 
Organic Land Law,33 and the farmers of the consolidated landholdings synchronize their 
planting within their consolidated parcels. The impetus for farmers to consolidate their 
landholdings is what forms the second policy, The Crop Intensification Program (CIP). 
Farmers in areas that consolidate their landholdings are given access to the CIP, the aim 
of which is to provide farmers with higher yielding seeds, and subsidized fertilizer. Local 
governments supply the seeds and fertilizers, and the goal is that this service will be taken 
over by private firms.34 Early assessment of these two projects indicates some 
advancement within the sector that can be linked directly to these two programs.35  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Kathiresan (2012), pg. 3.  
31 Kathiresan (2012), pg. 5.  
32 GOR (2001), pg. 4. 
33 GOR (2008a), Article 39, pg. 37. 
34 Katherisan (2012) pg. 4.  
35 For a detailed assessment of the land consolidation program and the CIP see Katherisan (2011), and 
Katherisan (2012). 
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Under SPAT III, MINAGRI is looking to develop new seed varieties, and 
introduce new seeds to its germplasm to complement these two programs.36 RAB is in the 
process of developing seeds that can be included as certified seeds for the CIP program, 
and one of the flagship initiatives for encouraging demand among farmers for improved 
seed varieties is through demonstration plots and training.37 MINAGRI is also looking to 
increase mechanization within the agricultural sector, and explore emerging value chains 
such as those in fisheries and sericulture.38 	  
Agricultural policy in Uganda 
In Uganda, agriculture is also treated as a priority area of development. During 
the time that Rwanda was gripped by a civil war that culminated in the Genocide Against 
the Tutsis, Uganda’s newly formed government, the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) (1986), was initiating countrywide reforms.39 Following the ousting of Milton 
Obote’s second regime by the NRM, the new government sought to reform the Ugandan 
economy.40  This had the overarching impact in Uganda’s agricultural sector of realizing 
‘liberalized’ agricultural policies. Since 1997, Uganda has been implementing successive 
development strategies that stem from its broad reaching National Development Plan 
(NDP).41 The mainstay for growth in Uganda as outlined in the NDP has been to 
encourage investment in the private sector, and the development plan was interpreted by 
technical ministries, such as MAAIF, to create policies that would generate growth within 
their respective sectors.42  
 
Originally, MAAIF created two programs that stemmed from the development 
plans outlined in the NDP. The programs were called Plan for the Modernisation of 
Agriculture, and the Rural Development Strategy, which were initially articulated and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 MINAGRI (2013), pg. 18.  
37 Ibid.  
38 MINAGRI (2013), pg. 11. 
39 FAO (2013), pg. 173-174.  
40 For more information of liberalization in Uganda’s agricultural sector in the 1990’s see Belshaw et al. 
(1999). Also, see Kannyo (2004) pg. 126-130 for more information on the NRM and its emergence in 
Uganda.   
41 MAAIF (2013), pg. 2.  
42 MAAIF (2013), pg. 5. 
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implemented in parallel, and later harmonized under the Agricultural Sector Development 
Plan and Investment Strategy (DSIP) in 2005.43 The DSIP (much like the SPAT in 
Rwanda) is updated every 5 years, and the third phase is currently being updated based 
on the most recent version of the NDP, which was published in June 2015. The DSIP is 
also attuned to the broader development initiatives of the CAADP.  
 
However, private investments in Uganda have been slow to take off, and growth 
within the sector has been more-or-less stagnant. In 2005, the agricultural sector in 
Uganda employed 73% of the population, and accounted for 23.7% percent of the 
Uganda’s economic growth.44 By 2012, these numbers had changed marginally, and 72% 
of the population was employed in the agricultural sector, and accounted for 25% of the 
country’s growth.45 However, this modest increase between 2005 and 2012 is not 
indicative of a long-term trend of growth within the sector; rather, growth within the 
sector as a percentage of total production tends to fluctuate plus-or-minus one to two 
percent points every year.46 Moreover, the average growth rate within the agricultural 
sector is below the average population growth rate (3.2%), which would suggest that the 
average growth rate per capita within the agricultural sector has also been declining.47 
The target growth rate for the agricultural sector in Uganda is 6%, yet growth within the 
sector has fallen shy of this figure every year since 2000.48  	  
During the same time growth within Uganda’s agricultural sector has been 
lethargic, its policies have not changed significantly. Beginning with the Plan to 
Modernize Agriculture, MAAIF began to remove itself from any activity that could 
potentially be carried out by the private sector.49 In the late 1990’s MAAIF’s focus 
shifted from direct financial support for farmers to formulating strategic planning; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ibid.  
44 GOU (2010), pg. 77.  
45 GOU (2015), pg. 52. Statistics for the 2012/2013 year are the most recent that are provided by the GoU 
for development in the agricultural sector. It is possible that more current statistics will be published in the 
third DSIP – set to be published this year.  
46 MAAIF (2010). pg. 78, table 5.1 
47 MAIFF (2010), pg. 5. 
48 Ibid.  
49 This is made most clear in the original Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture Document (pg. ix), 
MAAIF and MFPED (2000).  
	   46	  
providing technical services; providing sectorial overviews and data; controlling disease 
and pests; and some capacity-building work in the production of seeds, stocking 
materials, processing, and education.50 Concurrently, MAAIF would not produce or 
supply planting materials (i.e. fertilizer); multiply seeds; or subsidize farmers.51 However, 
MAIFF is still able to enact some non-policy related responsibilities such as research and 
farmer training through The National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO). 
 
MAAIF is currently implementing four programs under its regulatory directive. 
Firstly, MAAIF aims to enhance production and productivity. Within this program there 
are eight sub-programs such as improved agricultural research and technology 
development; the promotion of labour saving technologies; better delivery of advisory 
services and improved technology; among others. MAAIF’s second program – to 
improve market access – aims to provide access to high-quality inputs including stocking 
material; expand rural market infrastructure; and strengthen farmer’s activities and 
entrepreneurship. The third program is to improve the enabling environment for the 
agricultural sector, and this initiative is largely focused on removing constraints that 
inhibit growth in the private sector, as well as a variety of capacity buildings initiatives to 
improve farmer’s knowledge of resource management. Lastly, MAAIF aims to address 
institutional challenges that exist within the agricultural sector, and this includes 
improving weak institutional linkages and regulatory mechanisms with the institutional 
structure of MAIIF itself.52 The overarching goal of these four programs is to “remove 
constraints that prevent the private sector from investing in the value chain.”53 
 
With respect to aquaculture, MAAIF’s current mandate is to better regulate open 
water fisheries, and encourage the adoption of pond-based aquaculture and open-water 
caged fish farming. MAAIF itself is a strong proponent of developing quality assurance 
and better licensing programs, while the Department of Fisheries, which operates from 
within MAAIF, advocates more strongly for the development of aquacultural training 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Ibid.  
51 MAIIF and MFPED (2000), pg. x.  
52 For a full discussion of MAIIF’s current investment and development plan, as well as in-depth focus on 
the four programs, see MAIIF (2010). 
53 MAIIF and MFPED (2010), pg. xv.  
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parks.54 Reversing the decline in fish stocks will no doubt depend on strengthening 
regulation within the fisheries sector; however, meeting MAAIF’s objective of increasing 
fish production within Uganda by 750,000 tonnes by 2015 (from 2010 levels) will likely 
result from the adoption of improved aquacultural methods among farmers, rather than 
increased regulation in open water fisheries.55 
 
Based on the Department of Fisheries annual report, the main avenue that Uganda 
is pursuing to increase aquacultural fish production is through the training of farmers at 
four demonstration parks throughout the country.56 The goal of these centres is to train 
farmers in techniques to increase productivity, as well as produce fry for farmers to 
purchase.57 Introducing demonstration and training centres to Uganda could, therefore, 
contribute to three development programs of the DSIP. Under the first program – 
Enhancing Production Productivity – aquacultural demonstration centres would 
introduce farmers to improved technologies and advise them on how to use it. The goal 
was to develop demonstration parks that also operated as fry hatcheries, and could 
provide farmers with high-quality stocking materials. The demonstration centres could 
also be the means to spur entrepreneurial behaviour among farmers under the second 
development of the DSIP – to Improve Market Access. In addition, demonstration parks 
could contribute to seeing through the development initiatives of the DSIP in the 
aquacultural sector by building capacity and knowledge among farmers through the 
demonstration process itself, and this would fall under the third development program – 
Improve the Enabling Environment for the Agricultural Sector. Indeed, demonstration 
parks such as the Uganda-China Friendship Agriculture Technology Demonstration 
Centre (UATDC)(explored more in Chapter 4) are part and parcel of the development 
initiatives for building on Uganda’s aquacultural sector.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 This discrepancy is evident when comparing MAAIF’s (2012) final synthesis report of the DSIP, and it’s 
analysis of development needed in Uganda’s fisheries sector (pg. 41-43) with the Department of Fisheries 
concluding remarks of its annual report (2012) pg. 38.  
55 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 22, 2015.  
56 At the time that the report was written it suggested that the four centres would be in Bushyeni, Kajjansi, 
Gulu, and Mbale, and that they were between 80-90% complete (some parts of the report say 80% - pg. 13 - 
while others say they are 90% complete – pg. 27). It is unclear exactly what this percentage relates to, 
given that the Chinese centre in Kajjansi would have been operational when the report was written. See 
MAAIF (2012a). 
57 MAAIF (2012a), pg. 27.  
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Conclusion 
Rwanda and Uganda face similar challenges in their agricultural sectors. In both 
cases, the respective countries’ improvements across a variety of sectors from health to 
industry rely on per-capita production improvements in, and labour mobility out of, the 
agricultural sectors. Childhood malnutrition and chronic food insecurity plague both 
countries. Levels of malnutrition in Uganda may be lower; however, Rwanda is making 
significantly larger reductions in its relative levels of malnutrition. Nutrition is just one of 
many issues within the agricultural sectors of both Rwanda and Uganda. Each country is 
also challenged with creating policies that are conducive to economic growth. Rwanda 
seeks to underpin agricultural development through public funding of agricultural 
services such as subsidizing fertilizer, disseminating improved seed varieties through its 
agricultural extension institution (RAB), and reforming land tenure systems in specific 
areas where staple crops can be intensified. Alternatively, Uganda is primarily concerned 
with fostering a policy environment that will enable private enterprises to provide 
development services within its agricultural sector. Uganda is also looking for improved 
seed varieties and technology to disseminate through the research and extensions arm of 
its agricultural ministry (NARO).  
 
In both cases the developmental climate is ripe for partnership with donors. 
Rwanda and Uganda seek to partner with international institutions, such as non-
governmental organizations, and bilateral or multilateral donors (as is evident given that 
much of the analysis above was sourced from documents that were written in partnership 
between local governments and international institutions). The desire for Rwanda and 
Uganda to partner with donors and institutions to access improved technologies is not an 
indication that these countries do not have the knowledge base to develop improved 
agricultural technologies; rather, accessing agricultural technologies from other countries 
is a fast-track to boosting production. China is one of the countries that has agricultural 
technologies that can assist in boosting production, diversifying agricultural subsectors, 
and encouraging entrepreneurship.  
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The initiatives, issues, and concerns, outlined in the chapter above are what the 
Government of Rwanda and the Government of Uganda brought with them to the 
FOCAC summit in 2006, which ultimately resulted in partnerships with Chinese 
institutions and agricultural demonstration centres. How those centres were agreed upon, 
what they aimed to do, and what it is that they accomplished will be the topic of the next 
chapter. 	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Chapter 4: The FOCAC Demonstration Centres in Rwanda and 
Uganda 
Introduction 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, Rwanda and Uganda face a number of 
challenges in their agricultural sectors, and in both cases, the respective governments are 
looking to ameliorate low levels of per capita productivity through higher quality inputs 
and training farmers in more advanced techniques. The purpose of this chapter is to 
explore the FOCAC demonstration centres in Rwanda and Uganda in detail, and examine 
the specific agricultural programs within Rwanda and Uganda to which they contribute. 
The chapter itself has three main focal points. First, this chapter will trace the chronology 
of the centres, in Rwanda and Uganda; how it was that these specific countries came to 
host the centres, as well as the timeline and details of the negotiations. Second, this 
chapter will look at the protocols of the demonstration centres. Lastly, this chapter will 
detail the programs that the centres contributed to: soil and water conservation, 
sericulture, rice, and mushrooms in Rwanda; and pond-based aquaculture, and open water 
caged fish farming in Uganda. I will also discuss the centres’ current status. 
 
In Chapter 5, I will unpack the benefits of the centres for Rwanda, Uganda, and 
China, but it is important to understand how the centres were agreed upon to provide the 
descriptive background for that analysis. Exploring how it is that the centres came to be 
also helps support the idea that the demonstration centres are every bit as much an 
initiative of the countries that host them as they are a component of China’s diplomatic 
and commercial interests in Africa. In this chapter I explore how the technology transfers 
and demonstrations contribute to development plans that already exist in Rwanda and 
Uganda, and this information adds nuance to the existing picture of Sino-African affairs. 
Indeed, by treating Rwandan and Ugandan agricultural institutions as the primary agents 
of change in their domestic agricultural sectors, and uncovering that the FOCAC 
demonstration centres are equally a product of Rwandan and Ugandan diplomacy as they 
are a result of Chinese foreign policy, we can examine the relationship more fully. 
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Throughout this chapter, I will also explore in more detail how the Chinese agricultural 
technologies introduced at the demonstration centres are appropriate, and easy to adopt in 
rural African environments.  
 
The FOCAC agricultural demonstration centers in Rwanda and Uganda discussed 
in this chapter have not been explored in previous literature. In fact, none of the 14 
demonstration centers that were agreed on at the Summit in 2006, or the additional six 
that were discussed in 2009, have played much more than a bit part role in previous 
studies. Brautigam and Tang (2012) conducted a study on China’s agricultural 
engagement in Tanzania for the International Food Policy Research Institute, and visited 
the FOCAC demonstration centre in Tanzania. However, the centre itself was not the 
focus of their study so much as it was seen as one China-backed investment among many 
in Tanzania’s rural sector. French (2014) visited the FOCAC centre in Liberia for his 
book, China’s Second Continent. French’s analysis of the centre itself was, however, 
quite limited, and did not focus on the interpretation of the demonstration park by the 
Liberian technicians. Buckley (2012) conducted a study that focused on a Chinese 
demonstration centre in Senegal. The centre was not a FOCAC demonstration centre, but 
a former Taiwanese demonstration farm that China had taken over after Senegal re-
established diplomatic ties with China in 2005. Buckley’s field methods were similar to 
those that I used in this study; however, Buckley focused primarily on the Chinese 
interpretation of Senegalese agriculture. Therefore, the following analysis is the first of 
its kind to trace the development of Sino-African agricultural demonstration centres from 
the perspective of the African countries and institutions that host them.  
 
Deliberating the demonstration centres  
Rwanda 
 In 2005, and under the direction of agricultural development that had been 
outlined in SPAT I, the Ministry of Agriculture in Rwanda began a dialogue with a 
professor from Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University (FAFU) named Lin Zhanxi. 
Dr. Lin had a patented method of growing mushrooms called JUNCAO, as well as the 
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patent on a number of upland rice varieties.1  Upland rice differs from paddy rice in that it 
can be grown on rain-fed hillsides, and does not need to be grown in supersaturated soil, 
as is the case with most paddy varieties. It is not a variety that is specific to FAFU, as 
upland varieties are available from a number of sources; for example, the National Crop 
Resources Research Institute (NACRRI) in Uganda has a program in place to adopt 
Upland NERICA varieties in the Masaka region of Uganda.2 However, Rwanda sought to 
partner with FAFU as the patent was relatively cheap ($120,000 US); the program would 
include training from Chinese technicians; and they would introduce multiple new crops 
and techniques.3 Moreover, Dr. Li had experience extending JUNCAO and upland rice to 
projects in Lesotho, South Africa, and New Guinea, and these projects had been 
successful.4  
 
The original project description that was outlined in 2005 was ambitious.  It 
predicted that FAFU could train 100 technicians in JUNCAO techniques, and teach 2000 
farmers how to grow upland rice and mushrooms.5 It also promised to have a gender 
focus, assuring that 70% of the beneficiaries of the project would be women.6 According 
to the agreement, MINAGRI was responsible for the demonstration expenses, salaries of 
the Chinese technicians, transportation fees, seeds, mushrooms spawn and substrate 
expenses, and production materials.7 
 
The arrangement between FAFU and MINAGRI was the precursor to the Chinese 
demonstration centre.  However, the original agricultural technology transfer was not 
orchestrated through a demonstration centre per se. Rather, the original training of 
JUNCAO and upland rice was to be carried out by two technicians who were stationed at 
a house that was provided by the GoR in Kabuye (an area twenty minutes north of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 MINAGRI (2005). 
2Based on a pamphlet I collected from NACIRRI 
3 Ibid.  
4 FJDEA (2012) 
5 Lin (2005).  
6 Ibid.  
7 Lin (2005); MINAGRI (2005).  
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Kigali).8  The agreement to expand the project into one of the FOCAC demonstration 
centres was then negotiated a year later at the 2006 Summit.9 However, the original 
agreement with FAFU was not subsumed by the promise to develop a larger 
demonstration site. Rather, the original demonstration outlined by FAFU and MINAGRI 
continued as planned, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rwanda, and the trade and 
industry attaché of the Chinese embassy negotiated the specifics of developing the 
demonstration centre.10  
 
 In this respect, Rwanda’s use of Chinese agricultural techniques was the product 
of Rwanda approaching China, and expanding a development that was already in place 
under the auspices of FOCAC. The successful partnership that came of the original 
FAFU demonstration likely indicated to China that Rwanda was well organized, and safe 
for investments. As was mentioned in the literature review, China has prioritized 
‘mutually beneficial’ projects since the 1980’s to avoid pumping money into projects that 
will collapse without the continued assistance of the Chinese government. The successful 
use of the patent between 2006 and 2008 likely made Rwanda a promising place to 
initiate an agricultural development project.  
 
Uganda 
The decision to place an agricultural development centre in Uganda was largely 
the result of the Ugandan government seeking agricultural partnerships that would 
introduce new technologies to farmers. Uganda’s National Development Plan aims to 
transform “Ugandan society from a peasant to a modern and prosperous country within 
30 years.”11 According to Uganda’s agricultural development strategy, a central aim is to 
partner with investors who can facilitate the access and availability of scientific and 
technologically advanced inputs for the agricultural sector, and assist farmers to move up 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Lin (2005); RATDC staff member and JUNCAO entrepreneur, personal communication, March 12th, 
2015; RATDC staff member and training assistant, personal communication, March 20th, 2015; RATDC 
staff member and mushroom extension officer, April 15th, 2015 
9 Director General of RAB, personal communication, April 14th, 2015 
10 MINAGRI (2008); Director General of RAB, personal communication, April 14th, 2015.  
11 GOU (2011), pg. 1. 
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the value chain.12 Indeed, the Ugandan delegation that visited China brought this 
sentiment with them to the Forum.13  
 
According to a senior staff member at NARO who was close to the negotiations, 
the idea of receiving a grant from China for agricultural development was at the request 
of the Ugandan government. When I asked if the inception of the centre involved Uganda 
approaching China, or China approaching Uganda, he said:  
 
Of course it was at the request of African countries because we were the 
recipient…African countries requested, and China implemented them, these are 
grants, it’s not a loan, it’s a grant.14 
 
When the Ugandan delegation went to the FOCAC summit in 2006, they did not, 
however, go with the intention to partner with China in aquaculture. Following the 
meetings in 2006, a Chinese delegation began to work with MAAIF, and explored a 
number of different institutions within NARO as potential partners to host the Chinese 
demonstrations centre.15 Among them were livestock (NaLIRRI), crops (NaCRRI), and 
fisheries (NaFIRRI).  When discussing why it was that the Chinese delegation chose to 
partner with NaFIRRI, the former Commissioner of Fisheries told me that it was purely 
based on data. The Chinese delegation had found that NaFIRRI and the ARDC were well 
organized, and had a proven track record of managing loans and grants – they had 
successfully done so with the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the Department for International Development (UK-DFID), the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), and the World Bank.16  
   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In the GOU (2010) report, the importance of attracting investment to assist farmers in moving up the 
value chain is noted throughout the document.  
13 NaFIRRI senior personnel, personal communication, June 4th, 2015. 
14 NARO senior personnel, personal communication, June 11th, 2015 
15 ARDC Research Officer, personal Communication May 28th, 2015; MAAIF senior personnel, personal 
communication, May 30th, 2015; NaFIRRI senior personnel, personal communication, June 4th, 2015; 
Principal Fisheries Officer at MAAIF, personal communication, June 8th, 2015; NARO senior personnel, 
June 11th, 2015. 
16 Principal Fisheries Officer at MAAIF, personal communication, June 8th, 2015. 
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Following the decision to partner with NaFIRRI, a second delegation came in 
2007 to negotiate a protocol with the commissioner of fisheries and the director of 
research at ARDC, as well as other high-ranking members within NaFIRRI, NARO, and 
MAIFF, and the decision to partner with NaFIRRI was supported by many of the 
researchers who worked at the centre at the time.17 Most of the negotiations took place in 
Uganda, and were then finalized in China.  
 
Protocols of Engagement 
The protocols for the centres in Rwanda and Uganda were signed in May and 
June 2008 respectively, and outlined similar plans for the construction and operation of 
the centres. Both protocols preface the agreement by acknowledging that the centre was 
decided on at the Summit in 2006, and both centres were funded by an Agreement on 
Economic and Technical Cooperation established in 2007.18 The full cost of building 
both the centres, as well as all costs for machinery used at the centres, would be borne by 
the Chinese government.  In addition, both the protocols outline that the centres have 
three clearly defined phases: a construction phase where the centre would be built; an 
operational phase when the demonstrations and training would be conducted; and a ‘joint 
venture’ phase, where the centre would sustain itself through a private partnership 
between the Chinese firm that operated the centre, and a local firm or institution that was 
appointed by the government.    
 
In Rwanda, the China-Rwanda Agriculture Technology Demonstration Centre 
(RATDC) was to be built on 22.6 hectares of land at RAB’s Rubona station.19 The centre 
would be built by a Chinese company (the company is not specified in the protocols), and 
would include an administrative building, trainings rooms, production workshops, 
dwelling rooms, farm-land for crop experiments, production and demonstration, irrigation 
facilities, infield roads, and equipment for the demonstrations.20 The protocols also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 22nd, 2015; ARDC Research Officer, personal 
communication, May 26th, 2015; ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, June 2nd, 2015. 
18 GOR (2008); GOU (2008) 
19 GOR (2008). 
20 Ibid.  
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stipulate mulberry planting and silkworm raising, JUNCAO mushroom cultivation, soil 
and water conservation, and both paddy and upland rice would be demonstrated. 
Following the construction phase, the government of China was to finance the operation 
of the centre, and dispatch experts for seed breeding, production, processing, and 
demonstrations.21 
 
Alternatively, the Uganda-China Friendship Agricultural Technology 
Demonstration Centre would be built in Kajjansi at the ARDC on a 20.82 hectare plot.22 
The main aspect of the project involved the construction of office buildings; residences 
for Chinese technicians; a hatchery; a feed factory; and rehabilitating existing fish ponds 
– all of which were to be used for trainings of Ugandan fish farmers, as well as to provide 
income to the centre for its operation and maintenance.23 Following the operational phase 
the centre would enter a ‘sustainability phase’ where the centre would supply its own 
funds, and if the income did not meet the expenditures, the government of China agreed 
to cover the costs.24 During this period, “The government of Uganda has the right to 
supervise the revenue and expenditure of this project, and the Chinese executive 
enterprise is duly bound to provide the financial report of the project to the government 
of Uganda and regular intervals.”25 However, these financial reports were not forth 
coming. 
 
According to previous studies, officials at the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture 
were concerned that demonstration centres that had been implemented in other countries 
had issues of sustainability, which is to say they struggled to support themselves after the 
Chinese technicians left.26 In light of this, it was decided that the demonstration centres 
should be run by Chinese’ businesses under a profit-oriented model.27 In the Rwandan 
protocols, the final phase of the centre is referred to as a joint-venture phase that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Ibid.  
22 GOU (2008).  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Brautigam (2009), pg. 249; Li et al. (2012), pg. 233. 
27 Ibid. 
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commences after the initial three years of funding from China. The joint-venture phase is 
supposed to last for ten years, and outlines that the Government of Rwanda must: 
 
[F]acilitate [the joint venture] to purchase or lease lands required, and provide to 
it preferential accepted policies on land, investment, tariff, tax, trade, foreign 
exchange control and other aspects.28  
 
Within the protocols, there is no discussion of if, or when the Chinese company 
would be expected to leave. The conditions in Uganda are very similar. The second last 
article of the agreements says that the Ugandan Government will:  
 
[S]upport the Chinese enterprise to develop the market-oriented operation for the 
sustainable development of the centre, the Uganda government shall provide 
another land free of charge for production (or lease/sale the land in favourable 
conditions), and provide facilities and preferential policies of the investment in 
their market-oriented activities.29 
 
Demonstrations at the China-Rwanda Agriculture Technology Demonstration 
Centre (RATDC)  
Sericulture 
The centre aimed to build on the goals of SPAT, which meant MINAGRI was 
interested in developing a centre that would not only contribute to boosting production, 
but could also introduce new agricultural subsectors. In particular, MINAGRI was 
interested in subsectors that had the potential for value addition. Rwanda had already 
purchased a patent for rice and JUNCAO mushrooms from a Chinese university – Fujian 
Agricultural and Forestry University (FAFU) – which was eventually selected by China 
to operate the demonstration.30 Deciding what programs the centre would offer was not 
only a question of what subsectors MINAGRI was keen to foster, but also what 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 GOR (2008), pg. 6.  
29 GOU (2008), pg. 6.  
30 Director General of RAB, personal communication, April 14th, 2015. 
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subsectors FAFU could assist with. Sericulture was an attractive option because it had the 
potential to introduce a new agricultural practice; silk can be produced relatively cheaply; 
it could attract private investments; value could be added within Rwanda; and it is non-
perishable. However, the effort to start a sericulture program was largely ineffective – an 
admission that was made by both RAB and the FAFU technicians.31  
 
The largest barrier was the fact that Rwanda does not have a facility close to the 
demonstration centre to process silk from silkworm cocoons (or any operating silk 
factory in the country for that matter), and to produce silk that can be woven into a fabric 
silkworm cocoons need to be boiled and unravelled before being spun into silk thread. In 
modern processing facilities the unravelled cocoons will be spun into silk thread with 
machines, though traditionally silk can be spun on a large wheel by hand. The protocols 
of the centre did not call for the development of silk production facilities, or 
demonstrations on silk spinning. Rather, FAFU was supposed to bring some Chinese 
mulberry varieties, and demonstrate how to harvest cocoons, and create silk products 
from unwoven silk. This meant the products that could be created in Rwanda were 
limited to hard pillows that can be made from silkworm dropping, or using the raw and 
unprocessed silk from the cocoons as insulation in blankets – similar to goose down.32  
 
In all, only one demonstration in silk production was ever carried out.33 The only 
participant who was able to discuss the sericulture program in any more detail than to say 
it existed was the Director General of RAB, who expressed disappointment by the lack of 
effort on behalf of FAFU to make the sericulture component of the demonstration centre 
achieve its goals.34 Still, RAB and MINAGRI intend on developing sericulture as a viable 
industry in Rwanda, and SPAT III outlines that the government will continue to prioritize 
sericulture as a viable subsector within Rwanda. The expectation is that the RATDC will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid. 
32 In the humid equatorial hills of Rwanda, this was not a product that was in particularly high demand. 
33 RATDC staff and Mushroom Technology Officer at RAB, personal communication, March 30th, 2015. 
34 Director General of RAB, personal communication, April 14, 2015.  
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contribute to achieving this goal,35 and MINAGRI is currently looking to purchase low-
capacity silk reeling machine to convert silk into export quality silk thread.36 
 
Water and Soil Conservation 
Water and soil conservation demonstrations formed a second program at the 
RATDC. This part of the project focused on terracing, and demonstrated intercropping 
techniques with corn, beans, Chinese varieties of mulberry, and elephant grass. The 
terraced demonstration was set up on a one-hectare plot on a hillside in front of the 
demonstration centre itself, and sought to contribute to the SPAT initiative of Water 
Conservation and Land Husbandry.   
 
There were also three smaller terraced areas – roughly half a hectare in all – that 
were separated by short concrete walls. These three smaller terraces were used to 
demonstrate how much water and soil can be saved when hillsides are arranged in 
terraces. One of the three areas was planted exclusively with elephant grass; one was 
terraced and planted with beans; while the third was planted with beans on an un-terraced 
slope. The concrete walls that separated the three areas contained the water and soil 
within their respective plots, and each of the three areas had a well at the bottom that 
eroded soil would funnel into. The two terraced plots with beans and elephant grass had 
little to no soil in the well; the plot with ‘traditional’ cropped beans was nearly half full. 
The overall effect of looking at the three areas side by side was quite obvious: terracing 
hillsides and planting crops like elephant gross reduces soil erosion.  
  
The Rwandan and Chinese technicians who worked at the RATDC also carried 
out one terracing extension program. The RATDC sponsored a hamlet nearby to take part 
in a terracing demonstration that involved turning a one-hectare plot of land where six 
families farmed into an area with five large terraces. The purpose was to use one hamlet’s 
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36 MINAGRI (2013), pg. 35.  
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hillside landholding as a terrace demonstration in the hopes that other farmers in the area 
would recognize the benefits of terracing, and then choose to terrace their own plots.37  
  
Rice 
One of the most important initiatives that the RATDC aimed to contribute to was 
the introduction of new rice seeds. This program at the RATDC would aim to identify 
new seed varieties that could potentially be used to distribute to farmers under the CIP. 
When the demonstrations began in 2011 the team from FAFU brought 21 different paddy 
varieties to research, and selected the variety that performed best in Rwanda.38 Selecting 
rice seeds to grow in Rwanda is difficult because a rice variety that performs well in one 
area may not perform nearly as well in an area even twenty to thirty kilometres away.39 
The Chinese team found that a variety called Jinshan 28, was the best performing paddy 
variety they had for the Southern region of Rwanda where the RATDC was stationed. A 
rice specialist from RAB who had participated in a training session at the RATDC said 
Jinshan 28’s average harvest was seven tonnes per hectare, which is above the Rwandan 
average of just over five-and-a-half tonnes per hectare.40 The most favourable trait for 
farmers of the Jinshan 28 variety is that it can be harvested twice. Instead of cutting the 
whole rice stock from the stem, Jinshan 28 can be cut from the tiller, and if it is left in the 
ground the rice seed will re-grow. The average yield of the second harvest is roughly five 
tonnes per hectare.41  
   
The Chinese technicians, along with the help of a RAB staff, had demonstrated 
Chinese methods of growing rice in a few paddies close to the centre. One RAB staff 
member who had worked closely with the FAFU technicians during training explained to 
me the different techniques in rice growing that he saw to be distinctly Chinese. The main 
technique that FAFU demonstrated was a method of digging trenches a few inches deep 
throughout the paddy in a grid formation, and the rice seed would then be planted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Farmer in Rubona, Rwanda, personal communication, April 2nd, 2015. 
38 RAB research technician, personal communication, March 3rd, 2015 
39 Ibid 
40 Kathiresan (2013), pg. 15. This statistic was also noted by a rice specialist from RAB’s southern research 
station. Also, RAB research technician, personal communication, March 3rd, 2015.  
41 RAB research technician, personal communication, March 3rd, 2015 
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adjacent to grid. This meant that paddies did not need to be fully flooded to supersaturate 
the soil. Rather, water was let into the paddy so as to fill the dugout grid, which would 
then infiltrate the soil where the rice was planted. It had the effect of supersaturating the 
soil, but did not require the full paddy to be flooded, and proved to be an effective 
method for saving large amounts of water.42  
 
No one at the RATDC was able to tell me where the farmers who had been 
trained at the centre lived or farmed, and there had been no follow up programs on behalf 
of the Chinese technicians, or RAB, on how effective the demonstration of the techniques 
had been, or if the methods were still be used. Moreover, there was no data available at 
the centre that outlined how many demonstrations had been carried out, or how many 
people had been trained in growing rice. 
  
The FAFU technicians also demonstrated Jinshan 28 at RAB’s seed producing 
station in Mututu, a village about one-hour North-East of the RATDC. Here, the Chinese 
technicians had done a few trainings with a local rice cooperative, but again, there was no 
information on how much training had been conducted, or exactly who had been trained. 
The station in Mututu is also where the FAFU technicians had experimented with upland 
rice varieties (Jinshan 1). However, there was no one at the Mututu station who could 
speak directly to those trainings. From the information I gathered at the Mututu station, it 
appears as though the Chinese technicians had run trials on the Jinshan 1 two years in a 
row, but the second year there had not been enough rain, and the crop failed.43 Both 
Jinshan 28 and Jinshan 1 are currently being tested by RAB to be certified seeds for the 
CIP. 44 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 RATDC staff and training assistant, personal communication, March 20th, 2015.  
43 RAB staff, personal communication, March 19th, 2015; RAB staff, personal communication, April 8th, 
2015 
44 Director General of RAB, personal communications, April 14th, 2015.  
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Mushroom 
FAFU’s patented JUNCAO method of growing mushrooms formed the largest 
part of the RATDC’s demonstration efforts, and there was significantly more data 
available about their JUNCAO demonstrations. In fact, the head technician from FAFU, 
as well as the RAB technicians that were stationed permanently at the RATDC all knew 
more or less how many people had been trained in JUNCAO off the top of their head 
(about 1200). Any variety of mushrooms can be grown using the JUNCAO method, 
though only a few different varieties of oyster mushroom can be easily grown in the 
ambient Rwandan climate. By far the most popular variety was grey oyster, though the 
FAFU technicians were also growing shitakes, yellow oyster, king oyster, and cloud ear 
fungus (black fungus) in their demonstration plot. Developing a mushroom sector 
contributes to SPAT in that it introduces a new agricultural subsector of a relatively high 
valued crop. Unfortunately, mushrooms are difficult to export; however, there was a 
nascent mushroom market in Rwanda, and a number of private mushroom and mushroom 
tuber producing companies had sprung up following MINAGRI’s purchase of FAFU’s 
patent. In addition, dried mushrooms have a similar protein content to dried beans, and 
are reasonably easy for small-scale farmers to grow. In a number of instances, 
mushrooms tubes were purchased by local and international NGO’s to run village-level 
nutritional programs.45 
 
The centre also had a few humidity-controlled rooms that demonstrated how to 
grow a mushroom variety called ganoderma, or ‘the king of medicinal fungi’. It is a hard, 
antler-like, fungus that grows about a foot high in narrow and uncapped stocks. It is 
incredibly bitter and usually prepared by being dried, cut into disks, and boiled into a tea. 
Most of the ganoderma was prepared for demonstration purposes, though there was a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 I met with some representatives from Concern Worldwide who had purchased 20,000 tubes from the 
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participant received a call from a local NGO that purchased all 10,000 tubes he had produced that month. 
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small market for ganoderma – mainly among technicians who had been trained at the 
centre.  
 
The mushroom demonstrations would usually take place at the RATDC itself.46 
Trainings lasted three to five days, and involved both classroom components and 
practical demonstrations. During the classroom portion of the training, participants were 
instructed on how to make substrate mixtures. Mushroom substrate was normally made 
from cotton hulls mixed with rice bran and mashed corncobs, though some other 
ingredients could be substituted such as wheat bran, or dried elephant grass. The practical 
component of the demonstration educated participants in the whole process of substrate 
processing, as well as the process of growing and harvesting mushrooms. 	  
Demonstrations at the China-Uganda Friendship Agricultural Technology 
Demonstration Centre (UATDC) 
Aquaculture   
The RATDC is something of a research centre unto itself. It is removed from 
RAB’s southern research zone, and based on its own discreet compound. Conversely, the 
demonstration centre in Uganda is much more an expansion of an existing centre than an 
addition to an existing research centre as is the case in Rwanda. The UATDC was an 
addition to the Aquaculture Research and Development Centre (ARDC), which was a 
functional research and development centre before the Chinese intervention, though it 
was in very poor shape.47 Fenghuang Hauqio Fisheries Co. Ltd. (Fenghuang Fisheries) – 
an aquacultural firm from Sichuan, China – was selected by China to operate the 
demonstration, and prior to the refurbishments done by Fenghuang Fisheries, the centre 
had twenty outdoor tanks and roughly seventy outdoor ponds.48 It had an office building, 
and a structure that contained a few laboratories and a library. To this, the Chinese 
intervention had added a large building with classrooms, laboratories, and offices, as well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 RATDC staff Mushroom Technology Officer at RAB, personal communication, March 30th, 2015. 
47 ARDC Principle Research Officer, personal communication, May 21st, 2015; ARDC Senior Research 
Officer, May 26th, 2015. 
48 ARDC Research Officer, May 22nd, 2015.  
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as another building with dorm rooms for the Chinese technicians; they had landscaped 
the areas around the buildings at the centre, and added a roundabout that made it easier 
for cars and trucks to come and go. The Chinese also refurbished the twenty tanks that 
NaFIRRI used for research, and added another twenty outdoor tanks.49 They 
amalgamated and dredged the existing seventy ponds into twenty-six larger ponds, and 
built a hatchery and feed mill that produced a sinking feed – which differed from the 
floating feed most Ugandan fish farmers were accustomed to.50 The hatchery is equipped 
to facilitate the spawning of carp, and part of the demonstration was supposed to be the 
introduction of a few Chinese varieties of carp; namely grass carp, silver carp, and 
bighead carp (collectively known as Asian carp in North America).  
 
The carp program had been largely ineffective. People in Uganda are not 
particularly keen on how bony carp is,51 and fish farmers found that there is no market for 
the fish.52 One fish farmer told me that the Chinese had given him carp fry, and after 
rearing the carp to table size he was unable to sell them, so he gave them away for free at 
having lost money on the cost of raising and feeding the fish.53  
 
While the introduction of carp was not effective, the facilities at the UATDC were 
developed to breed both river running fish, and lake dwelling fish. Equipment to facilitate 
the production of river running fish was a part of the hatchery, and some technicians were 
familiar with how to use those facilities. Many river running fish – carp included – breed 
in rivers, but spend their life in lakes. Fenghuang Fisheries had built circular tanks that 
could pump water in such a way that it created a vortex. River running fish respond to 
this water movement by swimming against the current (mimicking an up-river torrent), 
and this water movement triggers their instinct to breed. This technique was not 
necessary for Nile Tilapia, Nile Perch, or Catfish, which are the most commonly farmed 
fish in Uganda; rather, it was introduced specifically for carp. Though the carp program 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 21st, 2015.  
50 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 22nd, 2015.  
51 MAAIF senior personnel, personal communication, May 30th, 2015. 
52 Cage and aquacultural fish farmer, Uganda, personal communication, June 16th, 2015. 
53 Ibid. 
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had ultimately failed, one researcher at ARDC suggested that the facilities could be used 
to work with some fish species that are endemic to the Nile-Victoria region of Uganda.54  
 
The most significant aquacultural technique that Fenghuang Huaqiou introduced 
was a method of grading Nile tilapia during the larval, fry, and fingerling stages. 
Typically, ADRC had placed a brood stock in an incubating pond, and harvested the post-
larval fish (fry) to sell to fish-farmers, or they would move the whole fry stock into 
another pond and allow them to grow to table size together. Alternatively, Fenghuang 
Fisheries would begin sorting, or grading, the brood stock using nets as sieves to sort fish 
by size into different ponds at a very young age. The result is that the young fish will 
compete with similar sized fish during the early stages of their lifespan, and by 
encouraging ‘size specific’ competition small fish that may otherwise die of starvation 
also reach table size.55 The only other way to achieve such uniformity in the size of a 
brood stock is with the use of hormones that reverses the sex of male fish at the larval 
stage.56 This method, however, is expensive, complex, and not conducive to nascent 
farmers.57 Alternatively, the use of the net-based grading techniques had drastically 
increased the efficiency of the fish, fry, and fingerling production at ARDC.  
 
The UATDC also sold fry and fingerling to farmers, and acted as a destination 
where fish farmers could get basic information, and troubleshoot problems that they were 
experiencing on their farms. The UATDC functioned much as the DSIP had outlined 
aquacultural demonstrations should, and contributed to three DSIP programs: enhance 
production and introduce farmers to improved technologies; improve market access by 
spurring entrepreneurial behaviour; and improve the enabling environment for the 
agricultural sector through capacity building with farmers. 
 
Using the new and refurbished facilities at the demonstration centre, NaFIRRI 
research technicians and Fenghuang Fisheries staff conducted trainings with fish farmers 	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over the course of the demonstration centres operational phase (2011-2014). There were 
no hard numbers available on exactly how many trainings had been conducted, though 
one of researcher at ADRC who worked most closely with Fenghuang Fisheries, 
estimated that somewhere between five-thousand and twenty-thousand farmers had 
benefited directly or indirectly from the demonstrations.58 I could not determine the 
accuracy of this estimation based on any information or discussion that I had to during 
my time at the UATDC.  
 
Open Water Caged Farming 
In 2011, Fenghuang Fisheries proposed that they add caged fish farming to their 
demonstration protocols. This was not a part of the original protocol, though NaFIRRI 
was interested in expanding caged fish farming production, and there had been some 
success among foreign owned cage fish farms in the Nile-Victoria region of Uganda in 
the past.59 After negotiating a new agreement with NaFIRRI, Fenghuang Fisheries 
established a number of demonstration cages in an area where Lake Victoria meets the 
mouth of the Nile River, in Jinja. The Fenghuang Fisheries caged demonstration area 
quickly attracted many other fishers, and it became one of the largest caged farming 
operations in Uganda.  
 
Caged tilapia farmers in Uganda typically use simple rigs made of bamboo, and 
nets. Traditional cages are two to three metres in length and width, just over one metre 
deep, and need to be stocked and managed from a boat.60 The cages that Fenghuang 
Fisheries introduced were made of metal, and were designed with platforms along the 
side of the cages so that fishers could get out of their boat, and walk alongside the cages 
to feed and manage the stock. The cages introduced by Fenghuang Fisheries were 
organized into square pods that each held four independent cages – this helped with 
managing tilapia at different stages of production, as well as eased the process of grading 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 22nd, 2015. 
59 ARDC Principle Research Officer, personal communication, May 21st, 2015. 
60 Jinja Fishers Associated member, personal communication, June 22nd, 2015.  
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the stocks.61 Each cage within the pod was three-metres by three-meters, and the nets 
were three metres deep. All told, each pod was roughly six metres by six metres, and held 
4 individual cages. Each individual cage could stock ten thousand fish, which is just over 
twice what traditional nets could stock. Therefore, each pod held forty thousand fish at a 
time, and could be operated in a cycle that allowed fishers to stock and harvest 
simultaneously.62 Fenghuang Fisheries had initially introduced the caged demonstration 
and stocked its own two-pods for demonstrations. The company continued to manage the 
cages commercially to provide revenue for the demonstration centre in Kajjansi. At the 
time I visited, the two demonstration pods were still being used by Fenghuang Fisheries. 
Again, this initiative contributed to many of the same overarching initiatives outlined in 
the DSIP as the UATDC.  
 
Current Status of the Centres 
At the time that this study was conducted there was uncertainty about the next 
stage for the RATDC and UATDC. In Rwanda, RAB was negotiating with the Chinese 
embassy about how to move forward. According to the protocols, the demonstration 
phase that was funded by China concluded at the end of 2014. However, the 
demonstration centre had not formally entered its ‘joint venture phase.’63 RAB was in the 
process of conferring with the Chinese embassy about the possibility of a one-year 
extension of Chinese funded demonstrations.64 At the time of my visit, the centre itself 
was not receiving support from either the Chinese or Rwandan governments’, and it was 
self-sustained – though not through a formal joint-venture partnership. The agricultural 
board and RAB staff were not benefiting directly from the sales of any products at the 
centre. Rather, the centre was being run by three Chinese technicians who continued to 
sell mushroom spawn, and turned over roughly ten thousand tubes every month.65  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ibid 
62 Ibid 
63 RATDC staff and mushroom industry entrepreneur, personal communication, March 12th, 2015; Director 
General of RAB, personal communication, April 14th, 2015.  
64 Director General of RAB, personal communication, April 14th, 2015.  
65 RATDC Staff and mushroom industry entrepreneur, personal communication, March 12th, 2015 
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During my visit, one JUNCAO demonstration was conducted with a group of 
community leaders from the Nyamagabe region of Southern Rwanda, which provided 
some revenue for the centre, though the participants covered the cost of the 
demonstration. During the Chinese funded phase the Chinese government funded the 
trainings. According to RAB and MINAGRI officials close to the negotiations with the 
Chinese embassy, there was still a need to flesh out how to streamline the management of 
the centre so that the joint venture would be profitable.66   
 
In Uganda, the negotiations about the next step the centre would take towards 
becoming a joint venture were unclear, and at times quite tense. Many – if not all – of the 
researchers at ARDC, as well as a number of more senior administrative officials within 
NARO and NaFIRRI explained to me that they were uncomfortable with that fact that 
Fenghuang Fisheries was still operating at the ARDC. According to senior officials 
within NaFIRRI and MAAIF, the Chinese company running the demonstration was 
refusing to leave the ARDC until they were given land from the government for free.67  
The discussion about land, and the process of how the Chinese firm would acquire land, 
was vague as it was written in the protocol; however, the Commissioner of Fisheries 
argued that the guarantee that the Chinese would get access to ‘free land’, as Fenghuang 
Fisheries was requesting, was not written into the protocols. Rather, this was written in 
the minutes of a meeting that had taken place between technical personnel from NARO 
and Fenghuang Fisheries in China prior to signing the agreement.68 As it stood during my 
visits to the centre, it did not seem as though the Chinese company was planning on 
leaving. There was a general lack of clarity about what the exit strategy for Fenghuang 
Fisheries would be, and there had been many discussions among senior NARO staff with 
the technicians and researchers at ARDC about precisely when they would leave. There 
was some discussion among senior officials about the possibility for one-year extensions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 MINAGRI Minister of State in Charge of Agriculture, personal communication, March 27th, 2015  
67 MAAIF Senior Personnel personal communication, May 30th, 2015; NARO Senior Personnel, June 4th, 
2015; Principal Fisheries officer at MAAIF, June 8th, 2015.  
68 MAAIF Senior Personnel personal communication, May 30th, 2015. I also came across the minutes from 
this meetings; however, it did not make any mention that the land would be given ‘free’. I said the company 
would be ‘provided’ with land following the demonstration process.  
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following the formal demonstration period.69 And while it was generally assumed among 
senior personnel that those conversations were taking place, it was uncertain what stage 
they were at. Some officials suggested that they had come to a standstill over the issue of 
land,70 while others suggested that the Fenghuang Fisheries would never get land in 
Uganda given how unsteady the interpersonal relationship between technicians at ARDC 
and Fenghuang Fisheries had become.71 
 
Conclusion  
 The experiences that Rwanda and Uganda have had with the Chinese 
demonstration centres share a few commonalities, and a number of differences. Firstly, 
the centres themselves contribute to programs that are in-line with the host countries 
agricultural initiatives. It would seem as though the Chinese delegations were keen to 
partner in areas where they knew their development efforts would be relatively safe. For 
example, in Uganda the Chinese delegates who coordinated the demonstration centre 
gravitated towards fisheries because NAFIRRI had the most complete data about their 
related sector. In Rwanda, MINAGRI had already purchased a patent from FAFU that 
allowed them to use JUNCAO and upland rice varieties. Moreover, MINAGRI had 
experience running a successful demonstration with FAFU, which may have led Chinese 
officials at the FOCAC summit in 2006 to recognize that placing a demonstration centre 
in Rwanda would be ‘mutually beneficial.’ 
  
The precise inception of the demonstration centre in Uganda is not entirely clear; 
however, it is clear that the Ugandan delegation was eager to get access to Chinese 
agricultural technology in any form it could. It is also clear that China chose to partner 
with NaFIRRI and the ADRC because of NaFIRRI’s data and previous success managing 
grants. The protocols of the agreements themselves establish what it is that centres would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 22nd, 2015.  
70 During my fieldwork, it was never made clear to me who would have been involved in these discussions. 
The Commissioner of Fisheries suggested I try an official at the MAAIF who coordinated all Chinese 
investments. After contacting the official at MAAIF, I was redirected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
who then redirected me to Finance – who then recommended I contact the MAAIF official who 
coordinated all Chinese investments in agriculture.  
71 Principal Fisheries Officer at MAAIF, personal communication, June 8th, 2015.  
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aim to accomplish, and the different programs that they aimed to contribute to. The 
timeline along which they would continue to function and the specifics of how the centres 
would be handed over to the local governments was much less clear.  
 
The last ‘joint-venture’ phase of the demonstration centres have not yet been 
achieved. In Rwanda, this was due to RAB requesting an extended period of funding 
from China before the centre became a joint venture. In Uganda, the centre had not been 
handed over due to a dispute over land. In addition, the way that Fenghuang Fisheries 
would begin the private phase of the operation was unclear. While most technicians 
agreed that the demonstrations themselves were largely effective, specifics about how 
many people had been trained were not always available, and some of the technology 
transfers were ineffective (for example, sericulture).  
 
The interaction between the Chinese government and African institutions is still a 
work in progress, and there was a general desire among participants to make the process 
smoother, as well as to continue working together with the Chinese. The central thing to 
note, however, as I have outlined in this chapter is that the demonstrations and 
technology transfers introduced at the RATDC and the UATDC contribute to agricultural 
development initiatives that existed prior to the centres inception. For example, through 
the RATDC a new seed variety of rice was introduced (Jinshan 28, and Jinshan 1), and 
this fed directly into the SPAT initiative that seeks to collect new seeds for Rwanda’s 
germplasm that can be introduced through the CIP. Again, the terrace demonstrations and 
extension program fits into the SPAT land husbandry initiative, while aquacultural 
demonstrations centres in Uganda are part and parcel of MAAIF’s initiative to boost 
aquacultural production, and spur entrepreneurship in Uganda’s nascent aquacultural 
sector. Indeed, many of the techniques themselves are also stylized in such a way that 
they are easy to adopt.  In Uganda, for example, Fenghuang Fisheries introduced new 
methods of grading to encourage size specific competition among fry and fingerlings, and 
this technique helped farmers improve their yields.  
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In the next chapter, I will further explore how it is that Rwanda and Uganda 
gained from the demonstration centres, and discuss how China itself may be gaining.  In 
addition, I will offer more discussion on interviews with participants, and their own 
experiences working at the demonstration centres, as well as some of the centres’ broader 
reaching impacts. 
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Chapter 5: The mutual benefit of Sino-African agricultural 
demonstration centres.  
Introduction 
Throughout my exploration of the RATDC and the UATDC I have arrived at 
three key findings that are relevant for the field, and these findings will be addressed 
individually throughout this chapter. In chapters 3 and 4, I explored how it is that Chinese 
demonstration centres can contribute to the agricultural development programs in 
Rwanda and Uganda. But why would Rwanda and Uganda be keen to articulate with 
China specifically? Many countries engage in international aid, and focus on agriculture. 
There are numerous NGO’s and granting institutions that assist in developing 
technologically advanced agricultural methods that could better the livelihoods of small-
holding agriculturalists; for example, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(AGRA), CIDA, or USAID.1 What then does China offer?  
 
First, I argue that African countries choose to partner with China because it offers 
agricultural solutions that are easily adoptable by small-scale farmers. In answering this 
question I explore the experiences that Rwandans and Ugandans had working with the 
Chinese, and I will situate these conversations with the broader dialogue between 
optimists, pessimists, and their relevance to the global food order.  
 
However, this leaves a component of Sino-African agricultural cooperation 
unanswered. If the partnerships were forged at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 
it would insinuate that there must a ‘cooperative’ component. That is to say, China must 
benefit as well. Indeed, China’s foreign policy is structured around mutual benefits. What 
then does China stand to gain from the relationship? This questions leads to my second 
argument: China stands to gain access and knowledge of agricultural markets for which it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 AGRA was very active at RAB’s Rubona station, while USAID had previously hosted a project at the 
ADRC in Uganda. USAID also have a very visible presence in both Rwanda and Uganda. Many 
participants would also note that they had worked with CIDA in the past, but I was never pointed to any 
CIDA projects in particular. It is possible some participants were confusing CIDA with the Canadian 
Cooperative Associated, which has a visibly presence in Rwanda and Uganda.  
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could be competitive in the future. Through the protocols of the agreements, Chinese 
companies get access to local markets, and are exempt from a number of barriers to 
development such as value added taxes (VAT), and assume preferential access to lease 
land. Moreover, there is no strong clause written into their protocols that would ensure 
that the Chinese company partner with local enterprises, nor is there a concrete timeline 
to suggest if and when the Chinese firm would be expected to leave. Indeed, this 
conclusion also has implications for optimists, pessimists, and the changing global food 
order.  
 
Lastly, I will argue that the demonstration process is imperfect, and its impacts 
are fairly limited. The introduction of Chinese technologies have contributed to the 
development of some niche agricultural sectors in Rwanda and Uganda, but once the 
technologies have been adopted by the private sector the gains to be made by the Chinese 
companies become limited. I echo a finding made by many Sino-African specialists: 
China’s footprint in Africa is highly visible, yet often modest in its consequence, and 
should not be overstated, as dangers of overestimating China could be just a harmful as 
inflating them. 
 
The ease of adopting Chinese agricultural technologies 
Why is it that African countries choose to develop agricultural demonstration 
centres with China? This is a question I asked at the beginning of this thesis, and it is the 
first question that I will address in this chapter. In various ways, the question itself was 
posed directly to participants. Sometimes I would ask: what contribution is China making 
to agricultural development; or, what contribution would you like to see China make in 
the future. The response from participants was uniform across both Rwanda and Uganda, 
and between farmers, research technicians, and ministerial workers: China’s agricultural 
technology is affordable, and easy to adopt.  
 
There was an overwhelming consensus among participants that China was an 
agriculturally advanced country, making it a natural source of agricultural knowledge.  
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Moreover, the knowledge and solutions that China has to offer are generally understood 
as being cheap and accessible for rural African farmers. One fish farmer in Uganda told 
me that, “when you go to the Chinese villages some of the peasants there are almost like 
Africans.”2 This is a sentiment that was echoed consistently across both countries, and 
between all participants: people see China’s rural sector as more productive than that of 
many African countries, but still largely undeveloped. Farmers, technicians, and 
government workers were unified in their responses that Chinese agricultural techniques 
were choice, given how easy they were to adopt. The Director General of RAB, who 
oversees the RATDC and liaises with FAFU university, expressed this sentiment most 
succinctly. When explaining why African countries in general were keen to approach 
China at the 2006 Summit to request agricultural centres, the Director General said: 
 
It was realized at that time [2006] that China has a comparative advantage in 
terms of cheap and affordable [agricultural] technology…So, this area has been 
identified as a key partnership area where China can invest and support the 
African continent in terms of boosting and supporting agricultural development.3 
 
Within the Director General’s response is a key finding that warrants more 
attention. The DG said that China has a ‘comparative advantage’ in cheap and affordable 
agricultural technology. One needs to ask, compared to what?  
 
By and large, the reference is made to Western agricultural techniques. One senior 
official at RAB’s southern research zone suggested that the harvesting machines used by 
FAFU were appropriate for Rwanda’s land tenure system.4 For example, China’s use of 
small harvesters for rice was cheap, and could be manufactured within Rwanda. 
However, when looking to buy rice-harvesting machines from the West, the senior 
official at RAB said joking that if it was to be bought from Europe or the U.S., it would 
typically need hundreds of liters of fuel and be equipped with gimmicks that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Fish farmer, Uganda, personal communication, June 15th, 2015.  
3 Director General of RAB, personal communication, April 14th, 2015.  
4 RAB Senior Research Coordinator, personal communication, March 18th, 2015. 
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unnecessary for Rwandan farmers.5  Another participant who worked with a private 
mushrooms producing firm told me, “Whatever your budget, you can get what you need 
from China.”6  
 
The reason why African delegations were keen to build agricultural partnerships 
with China in 2006 was echoed by the Principal Fisheries Officer at MAAIF. He said that 
when the Ugandan delegation went to the FOCAC Summit in 2006 their goal was to 
“access their [China’s] technology because of its easiness to adopt…That was our goal as 
the Ministry, to get Chinese technology in Uganda.”7 The Principal Fisheries officer 
negotiated the agreement alongside the Director of Research at ARDC at the time. The 
Principal Fisheries Officer suggested that he and the Director of Research at ARDC saw 
Chinese techniques easier for African countries to adopt because fish farming in China 
was a tradition, even a lifestyle, whereas in the West it was more technically focussed.8 
 
The technicality and problems of adopting Western techniques was also an issue 
among researches at ADRC in Uganda. Many technicians at the centre explained to me 
that Chinese techniques in fish farming were just a few steps away from what was what 
already being practiced among Ugandan fish farmers.9 For example, using earthen ponds 
instead of tanks, and not using any form of automation (i.e. oxygen sensors, or 
denitrifiers). One technician in Uganda who worked closely with the Chinese at the 
centre  
told me:  
 
[W]hen it comes to the Chinese interventions, they’re kind of bridging the gap 
between those very highly advanced technologies, which I would say are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The specific reference was to ‘bulldozing’ abilities of Western style harvesters.  
6 Manager of Outreach and Training, Kigali Farms, personal communication, March 17th, 2015. This 
particular participant made this comment in reference to harvesting machines from China.  
7 Principal Fisheries Officer at MAAIF, personal communication, June 8th, 2015.  
8 NARO senior personnel, personal communication, June 11th, 2015.  
9 NARO senior personnel, personal communication, June 11th, 2015; Fish farmer, Uganda, Personal 
Communication, June 15th, 2015; Fish farmer, Uganda, personal communication, June 16th, 2015; Fish 
Farmers, Uganda, personal communication, June 17th, 2015.  
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technologies from the Western world, and the very local technologies, or Asian 
technologies, or what we have here.10  
 
Another researcher at ADRC said: 
 
We were always thinking, ‘But how are we going to produce the number of 
fingerlings required for that expansion? [DSIP]’. But with them [Fenghuang 
Fisheries] we see it is possible with the simple facilities to actually produce in 
very, very, large numbers, and these systems are the ones we are now training the 
farmers to adopt also.11  
 
This does not go to say that the general principles of fish farming that Fenghuang 
Fisheries was demonstrating were unheard of, and some of the techniques that were used 
by Fenghuang Fisheries had been demonstrated before. For example, the process of 
grading (as was discussed in chapter 4) is not unique to China, and is practiced by fish 
farmers all over the world. USAID had been running a project at ADRC while the 
research station was being refurbished by China, and I met with one farmers who had 
been a participant in USAID’s project. This particular farmer noted that he was trained by 
the USAID project in the concept on grading, but the USAID project had used large 
graders apparatuses with adjustable metal slats, which he did not have access to following 
the project.12 He had not formally been a part of any of the Chinese demonstration, but 
was at the centre when the Chinese demonstrations began. After observing the Chinese he 
had adopted the Chinese method of using mesh-baskets to grade his brood stock. This 
farmer was also using a hormone treatment that he had learned from the USAID project. 
However, hormone treatment was an option as he was one of the larger fish farmers in 
Uganda.13  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 22nd, 2015.  
11 ARDC Senior Research Officer, personal communication, May 26th, 2015.  
12 Fish farmer, Uganda, personal communication, June 16th, 2015.  
13 Ibid. 
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In addition to the contribution that Fenghuang Fisheries made at ADRC, many 
technicians and researchers from NaFIRRI expressed that the caged fish farming was the 
most successful component of the demonstration. The station head at ADRC told me that 
he would give the demonstration in caged fish farming an ‘A+’, not simply because the 
methods that Fenghuang Fisheries demonstrated had been easy for farmers to adopt. 
Rather, there had been a sharp increase in caged fish farmers from the Jinja region 
coming to ARDC to purchase feed and fingerlings for their caged farms – something that 
he attributed directly to the Chinese demonstrations, and this participant suggested it 
indicated that the industry itself was growing as a result of the demonstrations.14 Another 
researcher working at ARDC told me that prior to Fenghuang Fisheries’ demonstration of 
caged fish farming, many people had thought that the caged fish farming involved 
“supersonic” science, and that now that they saw how possible caged farming was they 
had started to speak about the possibility of exporting fish.15  
 
Indeed, not only did the physical demonstration of the caged fish farming assist 
local farmers, the mere presence of Fenghuang Fisheries was functioning as a point of 
access for caged fish farming materials that could be purchased directly from China, and 
this ability to purchase materials from China was seen by many participants as the most 
useful aspect of the demonstrations.16  
 
 The agricultural technologies demonstrated at the RATDC were particularly 
valuable in the mushroom subsector. In Rwanda, the introduction of the JUNCAO 
method of growing mushrooms had been part-and-parcel of spurring the development of 
a number of private mushroom producers. For example, the CEO of one of Rwanda’s 
largest mushroom and mushroom tube producing companies noted that it would have 
been difficult to have started producing mushrooms in Rwanda had it not been for the 
demonstrations by FAFU, and MINAGRI’s decision to purchase the rights to use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 22nd, 2015.  
15 ARDC Research Officer and fish disease specialist, personal communication, May 29th, 2015.  
16 Fish farmer, Uganda, personal communication, June 15th, 2015; Fish farmer, Uganda, June 16th, 2015; 
Jinja Fisheries Officer, Uganda, June 18th, 2015.  
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JUNCAO in Rwanda.17 Additionally, one member of an all women’s mushroom 
cooperative who had been trained at the RATDC suggested that mushrooms would not 
have existed in Rwanda had it not been for the Chinese.18 Another entrepreneur who 
produced mushroom tubes suggested that had MINAGRI not purchased the rights to use 
JUNCAO, and had the Chinese not demonstrated the full system of mushroom 
production, there would be no mushroom sector in Rwanda.19 This does not go to say that 
JUNCAO is the only method of producing mushrooms, and some participants noted 
this.20 Indeed, some mushrooms producers in Rwanda suggested that they had adjusted 
their methods of tube production in such a way that it would no longer constitute the 
JUNCAO method. However, it was unanimous among participants that the demonstration 
centre had in some way helped them, or continued to help them, in their mushroom 
growing enterprises. Some fish farmers in Uganda had similar experiences, suggesting 
that caged fish farming may exist in Uganda had not it been for the intervention and 
demonstrations by Fenghuang Fisheries, but it would not have been operating at its 
current scale.21  
  
MAIIF’s interest in Chinese agricultural technologies continues to be writ large in 
its interactions with China, and the ministry is still actively looking for new opportunities 
to gain access to Chinese agricultural technology. In May, 2015, NARO hosted an 
agricultural exhibition for a delegation of Chinese investors. The exhibition showcased 
agricultural cooperatives, associations, agro-processors, and farmers groups to a 
delegation of Chinese investors from Sichuan. The aim was to show the delegation where 
knowledge gaps existed in Ugandan agricultural subsectors, and court investment. At the 
end of the exhibition, the Minister of Agriculture spoke publicly to the delegation from 
Sichuan. After discussing knowledge gaps in everything from value addition among 
coffee producers, to the need to industrialize animal feed production, he said, “I was first 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Chief Executive Officer of mushroom and tube producing company, Rwanda, personal communication, 
April 16th, 2015. 
18 Mushroom cooperative member, Rwanda, personal communication, April 24th, 2015.  
19 Mushroom tube producer, Kigali, personal communication, April 30th, 2015 
20 Chief Executive Officer of mushroom and tube producing company, Rwanda, personal communication, 
April 16th, 2015; Mushroom tube producer, personal communication, Kigali, April 30th, 2016.  
21 Jinja Fisheries Officer, personal communication, June 18th, 2015; Jinja Fishers Association member, 
personal communication, June 22nd, 2015.  
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in China in 1972, and I was privileged to be back in China last year. I am in a position to 
confirm to you that China progressed tremendously in the past 40 years – I have 
witnessed this myself.”22 He went on to say that in his experience he had seen that China 
had the technology, developmental experience, and finance to bridge knowledge gaps in 
Uganda’s agricultural industries (Personal recording). He concluded with a promise to 
sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Chinese delegation that very day 
that would provide land and facilities to the Chinese delegation. The specifics of that 
MOU, however, were not discussed at the public meeting.  
 
Within this discussion are a number of key findings for scholars of food studies – 
those who tend to be more pessimistic about Sino-African agricultural cooperation. 
Firstly, both Rwanda and Uganda outline that they aim to develop their agricultural 
sectors to become more productive, but also more industrialized. Partnering with China is 
ultimately one of many means to achieving this end.  Rwanda and Uganda are ultimately 
able to achieve these ends through their own initiatives, and they are very much a part of 
building partnerships with China – at times, Rwanda and Uganda are in fact the ones to 
instigate the partnerships. They are not the bystanders that are ill-equipped to make 
decisions in their own best interest. However, it would appear that both Rwanda and 
Uganda are keen to follow a Johnston and Mellor (1961) approach to development. That 
is to say, both countries see capital intensity and mechanization in their agricultural 
sectors as crucial for encouraging mobility out of the rural sector, a development that 
both countries are looking to encourage. Rwanda and Uganda are eager to increase 
individual farmer productivity, and capture economies of scale – China is one of many 
partners that can help them achieve this goal. Food regime theorists may see this method 
of development as an affront on rural livelihoods. For example, Akram Lodhi (2012) 
suggests that global agrarian question of the third food regime is, “whether capitalism is 
transforming farming and agriculture, and if so, how.”23 Akram Lodhi argues that foreign 
land grabbing is most emblematic of how global capitalism is transforming rural 
livelihoods, and while I do not disagree with this conclusion, I would add that based on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Bucyanayandi, T, Masaka Agricultural Show, Uganda, personal recording, May 28th, 2015.  
23 Akram-Lodi (2012) pg. 126.  
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the findings in this study, one of the main driving forces of extending capital intensive 
agricultural transformation is a product of the African countries domestic development 
policies. The Sino-African demonstration centres in Rwanda and Uganda do not 
necessarily grab land directly; they are still nodes of extending industrially oriented 
modes of agricultural production. Pessimists may be relieved to find that China’s role in 
Africa is not one of grabbing land, and therefore unlikely to be a driving force in 
redefining international agricultural divisions of labour that resonate with the first or 
second food regimes, but they may be equally critical of the Rwandan and Ugandan 
governments’ decisions to pursue industrial and capital intensive models of agricultural 
development. Based on this finding, critical discussions on the global food politics may 
be uncomfortable with China’s efforts to encourage this transformation. 
 
 It is undoubtedly for the greater good of African countries that they are able to 
express autonomy, and determine their own paths of development – even the staunchest 
pessimists would not be able to deny this. However, pessimism about China’s role in 
African agriculture will persist because the path that Rwanda and Uganda are pursuing is 
one of increasing capital intensity, and China seeks to enable this process.  In light of 
these findings, I would argue that contemporary studies in the global food economy is 
missing trends that are occurring outside of its traditional theoretical framework. Food 
regime theory, for example, does not address the nuances of China’s role in global food 
politics, nor does it take into account African agency, and this issue is worthy of more 
attention. 
 
Preferential access for Chinese firms 
If Rwanda and Uganda stand to access technology from Chinese companies 
through the RATDC and UATDC, what do the Chinese companies and institutions that 
deliver the demonstrations stand to gain? Granted that the demonstrations are agreed 
upon at the Forum on China Africa Cooperation, and the CPC has been keen to pursue 
mutual benefits in its foreign ventures, there must be something that China itself stands to 
gain.  As I will explore more in the section, the joint-venture phase of the protocols 
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function as windows of opportunity for Chinese firms to enter African agricultural 
sectors, and gain experience in those markets.  
 
Most notably, Chinese firms and institutions benefit given that there is no timeline 
for when they need to leave, nor is there any strong incentive from private Chinese 
companies that facilitate the demonstrations to develop meaningful and cooperative 
businesses with a local company. The lack of incentive and willingness to build strong 
partnerships with local institutions was made most clear by what many participants 
referred to as an ‘element of secrecy’ among the Chinese technicians that staffed the 
centres.24 For example, in Rwanda, FAFU technicians were hesitant to teach RAB staff or 
people who participated in trainings at the centre how to make mushroom spawn, which 
is used to multiply tubes,25 and the overwhelming majority of tube producers in Rwanda 
purchase their spawn from the RATDC.26 Holding a monopoly on spawn is lucrative, and 
at the time of my research spawn sales were one of the key sources of revenue for the 
RATDC. RAB’s own mushroom technology officer who had a permanent placement at 
the RATDC had not been trained by FAFU in spawn production.27 There were a handful 
of people in Rwanda who knew how to produce spawn; however, the lion’s share of these 
people had been trained by a professor at the University of Burundi, who himself was 
working on oyster mushroom production, and improving methods of mushroom 
production for small holders.28 One RAB technician who had worked closely with the 
FAFU technicians told me that broad growth within the mushroom sector hinged on 
training more people in spawn production.29 
 
The UATDC faced a similar problem with fish feed production. Many technicians 
from ARDC had a rough idea of how Fenghuang Fisheries had been mixing their feed, 
but the specifics of how all the components were combined in the feed had not been made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Nearly half of all participants interviewed mentioned that ‘secrecy’ was an issue at the demonstration 
centres. See Appendix B. 
25 RATDC Staff and Mushroom Technology Officer at RAB, personal communication, March 30th, 2015.  
26 Mushroom producer and entrepreneur, personal communication, April 30th, 2015.  
27 RATDC staff and Mushroom Technology Officer at RAB, personal communication March 30th, 2015.  
28 Chief Executive Officer of BN Mushroom Producers, personal communication April 9th, 2015; Manager 
of production at mushroom producing company, Rwanda, personal communication, April 29th, 2015. 
29 RATDC Mushroom Extension Officer and RAB staff, personal communication, April 15th, 2015.  
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clear to the technicians – though this was partly due to the fact that all the ingredients 
came from China, and were written in Chinese characters.30 At the UATDC, not only was 
Fenghuang Fisheries not forthcoming about the specifics of their feed production, they 
would not share information about their costs of production with technicians at the 
ADRC. This made it very difficult for ADRC technicians to gain an understanding of the 
economics behind running a larger aquacultural operation, and consequently, ADRC staff 
could not share this information with people who had come to the centre for training. And 
this was, in fact, a breach of the protocols of engagement, which clearly stated that, “the 
Chinese executive enterprise is duly bound to provide the financial report of the project to 
the government of Uganda and regular intervals.” 31 
 
 Not only did FAFU and Fenghuang Fisheries maintain a competitive business 
edge in the way they operated the demonstration centres, both FAFU and Fenghuang 
Fisheries were given preferential access to local markets through provisions outlined in 
the centre’s protocols. In Uganda, the protocols said: 
 
To support the Chinese enterprise to develop the market-oriented operation for the 
sustainable development of the centre, the Uganda government shall provide 
another land free of charge for production (or lease/sale the land in favourable 
conditions), and provide facilities and preferential policies of the investment in 
their market-oriented activities.32 
 
The protocols for Rwanda have a very similar clause, though it speaks more to the 
preferential treatment policies that should be given to the China-Rwanda joint-venture 
following the FAFU operated stage. The Rwandan protocols state: 
 
The Rwandan Government shall support the joint-venture to carry out the 
commercial operation in Rwanda, and facilitate it to purchase or lease lands 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 ARDC Senior Research Officer, personal communication, May 26th, 2015; ARDC Research Officer, 
June 2nd, 2015. 
31 GoU (2008). 
32 Ibid.  
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required, and provide it preferential accepted policies on land, investment, tariff, 
tax, trade, foreign exchange control and other aspects.33 
 
The possibility that the sustainability phase of the FOCAC demonstration centres 
could create tension following the China-funded period does not, however, go completely 
unforeseen in the existing literature. Li et al. (2012), note that without the oversight of a 
regulatory mechanism there is no guarantee that the independent Chinese companies 
would have any reason to cooperate directly with local institutions during the joint 
venture phase of the centres.34 Li et al. (2012) also forecast that this could be a major 
source of criticism of the centres.35 Indeed, the vague condition of how the centres would 
conclude was the most common complaint grievance among Ugandan researchers at 
ADRC. 
 
China’s approach to assisting agricultural development in African countries 
through cooperative and mutually beneficial developmental initiatives is a novel idea; 
however, the lack of a distinct regulatory framework or independent body to regulate 
China’s demonstration centres other than the economic attaché of its embassies does 
create problems. Following the Chinese government support at the demonstration centres 
there is no reason for Chinese companies to act any differently than any other private 
enterprise, and if the interpersonal relationships between the Chinese and African 
technicians falls apart the Chinese firms will have no incentive to maintain a strong 
working relationship with their African counterparts.36 Moreover, the Chinese firms and 
institutions that operate the demonstration centres have no reason to hand over the 
infrastructure of the demonstration centre if it is profitable for the Chinese firm that is 
operating it, and the vague protocols surrounding how the centre is supposed to transition 
towards a joint venture enable this.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 GoR (2008b). 
34 Li et al. (2012) pg. 233 
35 Ibid. 
36 Principal Fisheries Officer at MAAIF., personal communication, June 8th, 2015. This participant noted 
that the demonstration and joint-venture phases in Uganda would have been more effective had there been 
a stronger working relationship between the NaFIRRI technicians and the ADRC.  
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As was discussed in Chapter 2, there is reason to agree with Adem’s (2013) 
discussion of the optimistic assumption that the logic of capital will shift depending on 
who is in the driver’s seat. Based on the experiences at the RATDC and UATDC it would 
seem as though this is only true at the state level. China does mobilize aid based on the 
CPC’s own political aspirations, and this will leave a different footprint. However, once 
the cooperative phase of the demonstration centres ends, a Chinese corporation is then 
placed in the driver’s seat, and Chinese corporations will behave similarly to any other 
private enterprise when it is no longer constrained by protocols outlined by the Chinese 
state. That is to say that independent Chinese companies will be driven by profit, not 
diplomacy.  
 
One of the early causes for optimism among Sino-African observers was that 
China’s engagement in rural Africa was ultimately a projection of the CPC’s political 
aspirations, and these aspirations differed from the West. Therefore, Chinese aid in 
Africa would have different consequences for local development than Western aid.37 
Indeed, China’s current method of agricultural demonstrations is quite different from aid-
based interventions that originate from the West. One need look no further than the 
ARDC itself to see the different impacts between Western based aid, and Chinese 
assistance. As was mentioned in Chapter 4, ARDC had hosted a USAID project that 
concluded just as the Chinese project was being constructed. The USAID project left no 
infrastructure; it trained farmers to use hormone treatments to encourage size-specific 
competition among young fish; and used grading equipment that was inaccessible to most 
Ugandan fish farmers.38 Alternatively, the Chinese contribution had brought a hatchery, a 
feed mill, laboratories, sleeping quarters, and refurbished the existing research site. The 
Chinese initiative was not traditional ‘aid’, and it was indeed a projection of the 
Communist Party’s aspiration to foster goodwill and South-South development. 
Nonetheless, China did seek to create economic benefits for the companies that operate 
the demonstration centres, and it was a serious concern among technicians at the ARDC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Brautigam (1998), mentions this specifically on pg. 3, but devotes much of her book, Chinese Aid and 
African Development, to this theme.  
38Fish farmer, Uganda, personal communication, June 16th, 2015.  
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that they had lost some ownership over their ponds and research site.39 Even if their 
facilities had been refurbished, they were not much use if they could not be used. Chinese 
agricultural demonstrations leave a different footprint, but it is not always as positive and 
liberating as optimists suggest. One senior researcher at ARDC discussed his experience 
with both Chinese and Western donors, and said, “They are all devils, but one is a better 
devil. I am coming from a lot of experience.”40 
 
Limiting factors, and a lack of coordination 
 A number of factors limit the impact of demonstration centres. To name a few, 
there were significant language barriers, a lack of coordination between agencies within 
Rwanda and Uganda, and a lack of coordination between local institutions and Chinese 
representatives. These limiting factors are just a few of many that suggest Sino-African 
demonstration centres are components of the global food system, and indicate areas that 
warrant attention within the global food economy, but China’s role in rural Africa is not 
an avenue along which China is dictating a new food order. These arguments are fleshed 
out further below. 
  
First and foremost, there is a lack of coordination within the institutional 
environment in Rwanda and Uganda that inhibits the widespread adoption of 
technologies that were demonstrated at the centres, and this lack of coordination 
diminishes the attractiveness of investing in rural Africa. For example, RAB was testing 
Jinshan 28 to be formally incorporated into its seed bank, but the seed itself was being 
adopted informally among farmers who had worked with the FAFU technicians. I spoke 
with one farmer In Rwanda from a cooperative who had been trained by the Chinese. He 
showed me his paddies where he was growing his rice in Mututu, and it was immediately 
clear that he had adopted the ‘grid’ method of supersaturating his rice fields (discussed in 
Chapter 4). Jinshan 28 is still being tested by RAB before it is officially introduced into 
RAB’s germplasm, but this farmer had taken about eight kilograms of seed following the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication May 22nd, 2015; ARDC Senior Research Officer, 
personal communication, May 26th, 2015; ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, June 2nd, 
2015. 
40 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 26th, 2015.   
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harvest of the Chinese demonstration plots in Mututu.41 He then brought these seeds to 
his rice cooperative, and along with three other farmers from the cooperative he was 
testing the variety to see if it was worth growing in the future.42 He explained to me that 
there are official, and unofficial ways that seeds are introduced to Rwanda’s seed bank – 
this would have been one of the ‘unofficial’ ways.  
 
This farmer indicated that using unapproved seeds was a common practice, as it 
was a recent development that RAB had started to regulate seed distribution.43 However, 
he had very little to tell me about how much Jinshan 28 yielded, or how it tasted, as he 
himself had not tried it. He suggested that the Chinese technicians usually took the rice 
from their demonstration plots for their own personal consumption at the centre. As was 
discussed in Chapter 4, there is an aversion to local short-grain rice in Rwanda, and this 
could be a limiting factor in the widespread adoption of Jinshan 28. This lack of 
coordination and inability of RAB to fully regulate what seeds are used in Rwanda could 
be an inhibiting factor for the implementation of higher yielding seeds (Chinese or 
otherwise), as it makes it difficult to track patented seeds. The original MOU signed 
between MINAGRI and FAFU university in 2005 – when RAB first bought the patent to 
FAFU’s upland rice and JUNCAO – stipulated that the share of profits between 
MINAGRI and FAFU would be discussed later should FAFU’s rice varieties become 
used on a large scale in Rwanda.44 If RAB is unable to track the use of patented seeds 
through Rwanda, it could create challenges for RAB to purchase more patented seeds that 
are agreed upon under similar contracts.  
 
In addition, farmers who had participated in the terracing extension program 
through the RATDC failed to see the benefits of terracing. The process of terracing the 
land took about one month, and cost the RATDC about two thousand American dollars.45 
Spending money on the demonstration was a point of contention for the Chinese 
technicians and the RAB technicians who had worked on the terracing extension 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Rice farmer, Mututu, Rwanda, personal communication, May 7th, 2015 
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid. 
44 MINAGRI (2005), pg. 3.  
45 Farmer, Rubona, Rwanda, personal communication, April 2nd, 2015.  
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program. One FAFU technician explained to me that in China, people terrace their plots 
without being paid because they understand how it will benefit them in the long run, and 
he was frustrated that this was not the case in Rwanda. However, when I asked the 
farmers why it was that they needed to be paid to terrace their land I was reminded that 
there are two harvests per year in Rwanda, and farmers have very little time between 
harvesting and sowing to make terraces.46 The terracing extension program was so 
expensive because the terraces had to be made between harvesting and sowing, and the 
centre had to enlist the help of other farmers who lived close by to complete the terraces 
between seasons. Unsurprisingly, farmers were not keen to assist in the terracing 
extension program without being paid if they themselves were not benefiting directly 
from terraced plots. One farmer whose land had been part of the extension program said 
that if the government was going to spend money on assisting him, he would rather get 
access to subsidized fertilizer than have his plots terraced.47 The farmers did not claim 
that they had seen any difference in yields since they had terraced their plots; however, 
both the RAB and FAFU technicians were quick to tell me that the benefits of terracing 
plots takes a few years to become apparent, and that farmers would eventually see that 
they did not need to till their fields as deep, or let plots fallow as often if they had been 
organized into terraces.48  
 
One research technician at the RAB’s southern zone who was a specialist in soil 
and water conservation, and had worked as an administrator at the RATDC, said that the 
Chinese terracing demonstration plots in the concrete containments was actually a fairly 
standard way to measure soil erosion.49 While this demonstration was not necessarily 
showing a technique that was entirely new to Rwanda, it would not have existed had it 
not been for the Chinese intervention. Another RAB staff member who had worked with 
the FAFU during their demonstrations in Mututu told me that the terracing 
demonstrations were disappointing.50 This technician had hoped that the FAFU 
technicians were going to demonstrate how to make terraces that can grow paddy rice, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid 
49 RAB Research Officer, personal communication, April 17th, 2015.  
50 RAB staff, personal communication, April 8th, 2015.  
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instead of terraces that farmers were already familiar with.51 If farmers and local 
technicians fail to see the benefit of some Chinese techniques, it could act as a barrier to 
their widespread adoption. 
 
Language issues also limited the impact of the demonstrations, though the 
problem was more acute in Uganda. Many of the technicians who worked at the RATDC 
spoke English. In Uganda, none of the technicians spoke English, and all communication 
was done through a translator.52 Complicating the matter was the fact that the translator 
who worked at the station had very little knowledge of fisheries and aquaculture. This 
meant that even with the assistance of a translator it was difficult to communicate 
because the translator was not familiar with technical and scientific words that are 
common among aquacultural researchers.53 When it came to conducting demonstration, 
there would effectively be one person with little knowledge of the technical language 
translating complex presentations and demonstrations to a group of Ugandan farmers – 
many of whom themselves did not speak English, and required further translation from 
Chinese, to English, to their native language.54 Consequently, the demonstration process 
tended to be more show, and less tell than had originally been envisioned. Some farmers 
and aquaculturalists who had been a part of the demonstration process said this did not 
affect the delivery of the demonstration, and indicated that the simplicity of Chinese 
techniques did not require thorough explanation.55 However, many research technicians 
from ADRC indicated that the language barrier was an issue for them, as part of the 
demonstration was supposed to involve the transferring of more technically advanced 
skills to NaFIRRI researcher, and language was a significant barrier in that component of 
the demonstration.56 Language barriers will continue to be an issue for the adopting 
Chinese agricultural technologies across Africa. Not simply because it makes it difficult 
to perform demonstrations, but because English is the international standard as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid 
52 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 22nd, 2015.  
53 Ibid 
54 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 22nd, 2015.  
55 Fish Farmer, Uganda, personal communication, June 15th, 2015.  
56 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 22nd, 2015.  
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language of science.57 Indeed, language issues have always been an issue at Chinese 
agricultural demonstrations. Brautigam made note of this as far back as 1983.58 
 
 While China may have agricultural technologies that are easy to adopt, it does not 
go to say that agricultural technologies can be cut and paste. A limiting factor in the 
adoption of Chinese technologies is due to what one research technician at ADRC called 
‘technological domestication’.59 In Rwanda, for example, some mushroom tube 
producers had learned the JUNCAO method of production, but had altered the process to 
better fit their needs and available inputs. FAFU may have introduced the concept of 
mushroom tube production, but the best inputs that are available for JUNCAO 
technology in China may not be available in the countries that are looking to adopt the 
method, and it was local entrepreneurs who were adapting the technique to best to suit the 
local environment. Many mushrooms enterprises in Rwanda had adapted the JUNCAO 
process, and cut the incubating period of the substrate down considerably. The process of 
domestication was also evident among farmers at the caged fish farming association that 
had based their cages on what they had learned from Fenghuang Fisheries. One fish 
farmer from a fishers association that had been trained by Fenghuang Fisheries told me 
that had it not been for China, he and his fellow fishers would still be using bamboo 
cages.60 Since receiving training at the UATDC they had started to fabricate their own 
steel cages based on the Chinese model – the cages used by the fisher’s associated were 
better suited to their needs, and perhaps even more productive than the Chinese cages.61  
 
China, and Chinese institutions may have a comparative advantage over the West 
when it comes to appropriate agricultural technologies for African countries, but it does 
not go to say that Chinese companies will have an advantage within the agricultural 
sector where they introduce their technologies once the techniques have been 
‘domesticated’ by local farmers and entrepreneurs. While FOCAC demonstration centres 
may be an avenue along which Chinese institutions and firms can access African markets 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 NARO Senior Staff, personal communication, June 4th, 2015.  
58 Brautigam, (1983), pg. 58.  
59 ARDC Research Officer, personal communication, May 22nd, 2015.  
60 Jinja Fishers Association member, personal communication, June 22nd, 2015 
61 Ibid.   
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it does not go to say that this market access will enable them to ‘capture’ agricultural 
sectors overseas, and dictate their positions within African countries’ food systems. 
Rwanda and Uganda both have unique institutional environments, and pose different 
challenges to international investors. Local entrepreneurs ‘domestication’ of foreign 
technologies was found to consistently be the most effective method of agricultural 
growth within Rwanda and Uganda, and in this vein international investors will either be 
averse to the challenges posed by working in rural African countries, or limited in their 
ability to adapt their modes of production quickly enough to compete with domestic 
businesses. Given the challenges faced by FAFU and Fenghuang Fisheries to introduce 
their technologies through demonstrations in Rwanda and Uganda, and the success of 
Rwandan and Ugandan entrepreneurs in testing or adapting the technologies themselves, 
it is an indication that it will likely be African countries that determine their own 
agricultural trajectories in the future.  
  
Conclusion 
 
 Sino-African agricultural demonstrations carry with them a number of risks and 
benefits for both China, and the countries that host them. Throughout this chapter, I have 
explored many of these benefits and risks, and posed them as three arguments. First of 
all, African countries are keen to articulate with China because China has affordable 
agricultural technologies that are easy to adapt to rural African environments. In Rwanda 
and Uganda, both countries had the benefit of receiving agricultural technologies that 
assisted in the development of nascent agricultural subsectors: mushrooms in Rwanda, 
and caged fish farming in Uganda. Prior to the FOCAC summit in 2006, the agricultural 
ministries in Rwanda and Uganda were familiar with the comparative advantage of 
Chinese agricultural technologies, and they were keen to find ways to access those 
technologies, as they had the potential to contribute to agricultural initiatives that the 
respective ministries had already designed. However, these African agricultural 
initiatives that China’s contributes to fulfilling could spur a new form of pessimism about 
China’s role in Africa. There is a tension in critical food studies literature about how 
capitalism will affect smallholding farmers. The pessimistic convention is that China 
extends capital-intensive means of production into rural Africa due to China’s own food 
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insecurity. Pessimists tend to think that this is so China can transform African countries 
into its own agricultural outposts. However, here I have argued that it is in fact African 
countries that are keen to articulate with China, and it is a function of Rwandan and 
Ugandan agricultural policy that the links with China are made. China offers unique and 
affordable agricultural technologies, and that makes China an appealing partner to 
African countries. However, pessimism could continue given that China still seeks 
contribute to a Johnston and Mellor (1961) style of agricultural development.   
  
Indeed, China has reasons of its own to articulate with Africa, and I have 
uncovered part of this story as well in this chapter. Namely, China uses agricultural 
technology demonstration centres in Africa as a point of entry for Chinese companies to 
get preferential access to local markets, and gain experience in unfamiliar agricultural 
environments. The demonstration centres are primarily run by the Chinese technicians, 
who in turn have control over the centre’s commercial operations. This allows the 
Chinese managers of the centre to gain knowledge of the agricultural sectors in which 
they operate. The strategy of tying aid with commerce is a relic of Zhao Ziyang re-
interpretation of ‘non-interference’ that he announced in Tanzania in the early 1980’s. 
This offers an interesting reflection for optimistic assumptions about China’s role in rural 
Africa. Optimists often argue than Chinese farms in Africa produce for local markets, and 
my experience in both Rwanda and Uganda would confirm this. However, FOCAC 
demonstration centres enable Chinese firms to enter African markets, and pursue their 
own commercial interests. In this light, FOCAC demonstration centres are not quite as 
inconsequential for China as optimists often suggest. While there is no indication that 
China aims to transform rural Africa into an outpost for its own food security, rural 
Africa is a place where Chinese firms could be looking to establish a larger commercial 
presence. The demonstration centres are not entirely benevolent on behalf of China.  
 
For the African countries that host the centres, there is a risk that the Chinese 
institution or firm that operates the centre may want to stay beyond the timeframe that is 
established in the protocols. If there is no strong regulatory mechanism to ensure the 
Chinese firms leave, or cooperate with a local company to create a joint venture, it can be 
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a source of bitterness. The risk that Chinese institutions and firms take is that they are 
introducing their technologies into relatively informal agricultural environments. Cutting 
and pasting their technologies is not an option – they need to be ‘domesticated’ – and in 
all likelihood it will be locals that are best equipped to adapt the technologies to better 
suit their environment. The Chinese firms risk their technologies entering African 
markets along informal avenues – as was the case of the Jinshan 28 rice seed in Rwanda 
– and this could make it unappealing for introducing technologies with more rigid 
patents. Indeed, the risks that China takes through the demonstration centres are mainly 
commercial. The risks that African countries take in hosting demonstration centres 
combined with the risks Chinese firms take by operating them will limit the overarching 
impact of FOCAC demonstration centres.  
 
	   93	  
Chapter 6: Conclusion 	  
China shares a unique history with the African continent. At Bandung, Zhou Enlai 
had a chance encounter with Gammal Abdel Nasser, the apex leader in Egypt at the time, 
and their meetings sparked the CPC’s interest in building relationships with African 
countries. Through the non-aligned movement, China was able to follow through on their 
aspiration to build partnerships with African countries. Many of these relationships fell 
apart during the Cultural Revolution, but later came to fruition in 1972 when the United 
Nations held a vote to officially recognize the CPC. The vote went in the CPC’s favour 
due in no small part to African countries support for the more moderate post-
revolutionary government. As the CPC transitioned from the revolutionary party to the 
ruling party in the late 1970’s, the CPC began to engage with African countries along 
economic avenues, rather than through political ideology. Indeed, it was during this 
period that China began to operate its first agricultural demonstration centres, build 
cooperative projects, and seek mutual benefits through aid. China and Africa remained 
diplomatic partners throughout the 1980’s, and their economic relationships continued to 
develop throughout the 1990’s. Africa and China remain deeply connected to this day.  
 
In many ways, The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation encapsulates the full 
Sino-African historic gamut. It has diplomatic, economic, and cultural implications, and 
it continues to offer alternatives to Western engagement. How then can we understand the 
agricultural demonstration centres as a part of this history? What makes the 
demonstration centres so complicated to understand is that they embody a combination of 
diplomatic and economic interests. At times it feels as though the full experience of Sino-
African history is encapsulated within the demonstration centres themselves. Through the 
centres, China and Africa can decorate their relationship. For example, the agreements to 
development agricultural centres are negotiated at high profile summits; Chinese 
embassies often encourage local news agencies to cover large ribbon cutting ceremonies 
at the demonstration centres, and display China’s contribution to Africa; and the centres 
host high profile events with African delegates to show what has been achieved through 
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the technology transfers. However, the demonstration centres also meet commercial ends 
– they are points of entry for Chinese firms to engage in African markets, and they can 
help spur entrepreneurial growth in African rural sectors. Through the agricultural 
demonstration centres, China and African countries are able to marry development, 
cooperation, diplomacy, and commerce – in turn exemplifying their shared history.  
 
And through this history Chinese delegates are able to activate memories among 
African people, and among Chinese people as well. For example, China does not seek to 
dictate a global order by subjugating Africa, and Chinese delegates will often draw on 
Sino-African history dating back to the 15th century to indicate this. It is also worth 
noting that China has, in fact, never sought to dictate any sort of global order. One the 
most potent debates among observers of China’s foreign policy is whether or not China 
even has a coherent foreign policy,1 let alone an ability or desire to craft global systems 
in its own interest. China itself is somewhat passive in the institutions that shape global 
networks, instead aiming to articulate with existing avenues of trade and development, 
and avoid the risks associated with crafting global systems. In light of this, China 
articulates with Africa because their history of doing so has been successful, and there is 
far more to lose from disrupting this history than there would be to gain from redirecting 
it.  
 
In Africa, China sees a number of countries with which it shares a history, and it 
sees nascent agricultural sectors that could be profitable in the near future. China does not 
seek to shift the course of African development by dictating a food and agricultural order. 
Rather, China seeks to contribute to African agricultural development, and create avenues 
of entry for its businesses. Chinese and African agricultural cooperation symbolize shifts 
in the global food order away from Western backed regimes, but that does not mean it is 
emblematic of a new regime. Rather, Sino-African agricultural cooperation is indicative 
of systems that are emerging outside critical food studies paradigms. What this study has 
shown us is that African countries are becoming increasingly competent in dictating their 
own developmental trajectories, and China is a cog in the international system that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Shambaugh (2013), pg. 45-120 for a more complete discussion of this debate.  
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African governments and agricultural institutions can turn in order to access relevant 
expertise, and stylized agricultural technologies that are appropriate for their rural 
sectors. To Africa, China is an option – it always has been. 
 
It is important to understand this history, and it is important to understand how it 
operates in contemporary Sino-African affairs. It is time to begin forming new theories 
about the nature of Sino-African affairs and their place in the global food order. Had I 
taken the primary data collected in this study and fit it to existing theory, rather than 
assessing the facts and interpreting how existing theories would respond to them – as I 
have done throughout this thesis – I would have arrived at one of two conclusions.  
 
First of all, if this study had focused on the facts purely through a pessimistic lens 
on Sino-African affairs, I would have arrived at a similar conclusion to that of French 
(2014), who argues that China’s initiatives across the African continent aim to develop 
powerful feedback loops that will enable China to access resources, and that Africa is 
serving as a second continent for China (as the title of French’s book, China’s Second 
Continent, implies). Reaching this conclusion based on the primary data would have been 
logical had the data been analyzed through a pessimistic lens. The Chinese technicians do 
not want to leave Uganda, which according to pessimistic conventions is evidence that 
Chinese people are migrating to China to stay. The protocols grant Chinese firms access 
to land – again according to pessimistic conventions this would confirm that China is 
trying to grab land in Africa. And while the word ‘aid’ may be used in the title of the 
protocols of engagement of the demonstration centres, the pessimistic view would argue 
that the agreements ultimately enable Chinese companies to set-up-shop, and access 
African economies and agricultural resources.  
 
Alternatively, had I reached these pessimistic conclusions, and made them the 
tenets of my analysis, I would have had to ignore a number of more ‘optimistic’ analyses 
about the demonstration centres. For example, China and African countries mutually craft 
the programs that the demonstration centres contribute to, and Rwanda and Uganda 
approached China at the 2006 summit to host the demonstration centres – not the other 
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way around. Moreover, many farmers, agricultural technicians, and government officials 
are pleased with their newly acquired access to Chinese agricultural technologies, and 
many feel quite positive about the training they have received in improved agricultural 
techniques. However, had these ‘optimistic’ conclusions been the foundation of my 
analysis, I would have missed the in-roads to African economies that Chinese firms make 
through the agricultural demonstration centres, and not painted a complete picture of the 
risks and rewards for all parties involved. Throughout this thesis, I have accounted for 
both of these lenses of analysis, and how they may interpret the Sino-African 
demonstration centres in Rwanda and Uganda.  
 
If these conclusions are mutually exclusive, then what are we left with? What do 
these centres tell us about the nature of Sino-African agricultural affairs, and its 
orientation in the global food order? Ultimately, whether or not one sees Sino-African 
agricultural demonstration centres as positive, or negative, will come down to one’s own 
worldview. Insofar as one believes that the extension of more capitally intensive means 
of agricultural production are to the detriment of the global food system, then pessimistic 
views of Sino-African agricultural affairs will prevail. China and Africa may not be 
articulating according to pessimistic conventions exactly, but China does aim to 
contribute to African countries that want to introduce capital intensity and concentration 
in their agricultural sectors. Alternatively, if one sees a ‘Johnson and Mellor’ agricultural 
trajectory as best, then China is indeed a powerful force of good in shaping the 
agricultural trajectories of African countries, and the broader global food economy. 
 
China is becoming an increasingly powerful node of support for agricultural 
development, and it is important to understand the nature of this emerging trend. In 2012 
Hillary Clinton toured a handful of African countries following a FOCAC summit, and 
encouraged African countries to partner with “responsible powers”2 It was a veiled 
criticism of China, and it was an enormously inaccurate assessment of what it was that 
FOCAC agreements do. As this study has shown the FOCAC agricultural demonstration 
centres in Rwanda and Uganda aim to encourage liberalized economic agricultural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Associated Press (2012) 
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developments. China is, in-fact, enabling African countries to navigate the economic 
hangovers of structural adjustment, and other maligned policies that have been 
perpetuated by Western led international institutions. However, the Sino-African 
partnerships, such as those discussed in this study that can navigate these policies, are 
still in their nascent stages.  
 
At this juncture it is worth returning to a point brought up in the introduction of 
this study about the broader implications of Sino-African affairs, and their significance 
beyond academia. China’s role in Africa is a ‘dragon in the room’ of international 
relations. It is distracting from other topics, and it is every bit as dangerous to ignore as it 
is to try and shoo away. If the political and economic significance of Sino-African affairs 
are downplayed, strategies in the international policy domain could be caught flat foot, or 
off kilter, when addressing the changing nature of international relations. Alternatively, if 
China’s impact in Africa (and vice versa) is inflated, both parties could feel threatened.  
The pragmatic approach that I have taken in this study can contribute to clarifying some 
aspects of Sino-African affairs. The conclusions reached in this study suggest how 
theories on Sino-African affairs should consider the relationship in the future. The 
RATDC and the UATDC should not be considered as forays, but as partnerships that are 
indicative of a changing global food order for which the impacts and implications are 
only just emerging.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview Questions 
 
The following is a list of standard interview questions. This list is by not exhaustive – the 
semi-structured nature of the interviews meant that in most cases additional questions 
were added, impromptu. Additionally, not all of these questions were posed to each 
participant. The questions below are also not necessarily written exactly as they were 
asked.  
 
1. What is your own research background in? 
2. What does your current position at MINAGRI/MAAIF/RAB/NAFIRRI involve? 
3. With your background experience in research, as well as your practical experience 
in your current job, what do you think is the most important development for 
Rwanda/Uganda? 
4. In what capacity do external sources, be it NGO’s, multilateral institutions, or 
bilateral donors/partnerships, contribute to accomplishing these goals? 
5. In what capacity, has China, or the Chinese centres, contributed to accomplishing 
these goals? 
6. Can you speak to the inception of the centre? 
7. Are the techniques being taught at the centre integrating into farmers’ toolkit 
easily? 
8. Could you speak to the current status of the centre’s funding? 
9. In what capacity does China benefit from the project? 
10. Does the centre serve a purpose in addition to the demonstration of agricultural 
technologies? Perhaps a diplomatic, or political purpose? 
11. Has your experience at the centre made you look favourably on China as a 
country to partner with in your agricultural development? 
12. Of the many partner’s that contribute to Rwanda/Uganda’s agricultural 
development, does the contribution that China is making stand out? 
13. Are Chinese techniques and technologies easy to adopt? 
14. Are Chinese technologies relatively cheap? 
15. How would you respond to the criticisms of China’s agricultural assistance in 
Africa? 16. What role would you like to see China play in Africa’s agricultural development 
in the future?	  	  	  
Appendix B: Interview codes 	  
Code Sub-Code Number of 
sources 
Number of 
references 
China the Fish 1 2 
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competitor Mushrooms 4 5 
Cooperation Benefit to China 25 59 
Benefit to host 23 49 
Comments on centre 21 93 
Current status 14 24 
How people became linked 11 17 
Language issues 13 24 
Negative 12 35 
Origin of the centre 12 36 
Positive 25 56 
Secrecy 20 31 
Fish Fish species 8 14 
Mushrooms Export 2 6 
Gov’t perspective 3 3 
How participant was 
introduced to mushrooms 
6 17 
Market/marketable/market 
size 
6 26 
Mushroom tube prices 3 7 
Private connections to centre 7 33 
Private spawn production 4 10 
Producer capacity 5 12 
Production cycle 5 13 
Source of materials 2 2 
Reflections on 
host country 
Example of strong institution 14 34 
Most important development 16 31 
Problematic institutions 11 26 
Rice Rice growing techniques 8 20 
Rice varieties and preferences 7 27 
Upland 4 11 
Silkworm Background 2 2 
Terrace Need fertilizer 1 2 
Training and 
Technology 
Effective 17 29 
Helpful/useful 14 34 
In China 10 14 
Method 10 14 
What role of 
China 
China does it cheaper 19 38 
 Compared to other assistance 24 83 
Unique  5 8 
Easy to adopt 15 37 
In the future 26 40 
Introducing industry 8 18 
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Response to criticism 20 40 
Dealing with investors 7 22 
 	  
